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CRISIS OF WILL IN THE NATO ALLIANCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

U.S. POLICY TOWARD EAST EUROPE, WEST EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

SEPTEMBER 19, 1985

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CRISIS OF WILL IN THE NATO ALLIANCE

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 9:12 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Larry Pressler (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Mathias, Pressler, Pell, and Dodd.

Senator PRESSLER. I will call this meeting of the Subcommittee on European Affairs to order.

We are pleased to welcome you to the fourth session of our series of seven hearings on United States-European relations.

The overall title of this series is a provocative one: "Is NATO Still the Centerpiece of U.S. Foreign Policy? Should it Be?" We hope you will join us as our committee grapples with a number of very important issues in advance of the United States-Soviet summit.

A complete schedule of the issues to be discussed, including the dates and times, is available in the press room, next door, room No. 415. Copies of prepared statements and materials for the press and public are also available in the press room.

I believe that many of the issues most crucial to the United States and our European allies through the 1990's, whether they are bilateral, NATO-related, or East-West, will be examined in these seven sessions. We look forward to rigorous analysis and thought-provoking questioning.

We also hope that many of our guests will carry these discussions further in the media, in discussions among citizens, in foreign capitals, and in academia.

The title of this morning's session is "The Crisis of Will in the NATO Alliance."

We are fortunate to have Mr. John E. Rielly, president of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, a private foreign policy institute founded in Chicago in 1922.

Before calling on Mr. Rielly, we will call on Senator Mathias for any opening statement he may have, and then we will introduce our other witnesses.

Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. I have no statement, Mr. Chairman. I would only welcome the witnesses here today.

I think the subcommittee will profit by their testimony and by the views they will offer to us on a subject which is of continuing

interest and which is of particular importance as we approach this summit, which obviously is going to test the will of the Nation.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

I will first call, then, on Mr. John E. Rielly, president of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Mr. Rielly received his Ph.D. from Harvard in political science. Mr. Rielly has served in the U.S. Department of State, as a foreign policy assistant to Senator and then Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and was a consultant to the Ford Foundation on European and International Affairs. He became executive director of the Chicago Council in 1971, and has been president since 1974.

Mr. Rielly has served as a consultant to the NSC, has been on the editorial board of Foreign Policy Quarterly, and is a member of a variety of bilateral and multilateral organizations.

Mr. Rielly and his Chicago Council are well known as being among the most authoritative spokesmen on the changing American perspective toward foreign policy. Their publications reach the world audience.

We are especially fortunate today to receive their latest update on the changing nature of United States and European attitudes toward national security and the NATO alliance.

Mr. Rielly.

STATEMENT OF JOHN E. RIELLY, PRESIDENT, CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. RIELLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure to join you for this discussion about the general subject, "Is NATO Still the Centerpiece of U.S. Foreign Policy? Should it Be?"

In my summary paper that I have prepared for the committee this morning, I am going to address my remarks for two main subjects: One, the principal trends in both popular and leadership attitudes in the United States on Atlantic Alliance questions; and, second, similar trends in Europe.

I will begin with a comment about United States opinion trends on security issues generally before going directly to the question of United States opinion on Europe.

Here in the analysis that I am presenting this morning, I am drawing heavily on the most recent of a series of studies done by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on American public opinion and U.S. foreign policy, the latest one being published in March 1983. I am also drawing on a number of more recent studies.

The important point here I think is that most of the data on which I am basing my remarks were collected in the final months of 1982 and throughout 1983, a period when the discussion, both in this country and in Europe, was still very much shaped by the INF issue and the SDI issue had not yet come to the fore.

As a generalization, one can say that in 1983, compared to 4 years earlier, when we did our major study, we found that Americans were much more confident about their security overall, much more confident about the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. By that time, two-thirds of the American public and three-quarters of the American leadership believed the United

States was either equal to or stronger than the Soviet Union militarily.

This question was extremely important, indeed the most important question, in reversing attitudes on defense spending.

We found that, by the beginning of 1983, there was a 10-percent drop in support for increased defense spending, an exact reversal of percentages of 4 years earlier.

Four years earlier, 34 percent of the public wanted to increase defense spending; 24 percent to cut back. By the beginning of 1983, it was just the reverse.

This trend really continued, as we know. By the end of 1983, a Gallup survey showed that those wanting to cut back defense expenditures had gone up to 37 percent.

We also found that during this period concern about nuclear war increased considerably.

When we did the study 4 years earlier, there was so little interest indicated, so little response that we did not even include it in our report; whereas, it was one of the most frequently mentioned items by the beginning of 1983. Again, this concern about nuclear war continued; so that we know, by the end of November 1983, another study showed that 45 percent of the American public were very much concerned about it.

We also saw during this period very strong support for arms control. Two-thirds of the public and about 90 percent of the leaders were very much interested.

We also found that there was an erosion of support among the public for an active involvement by the United States in world affairs.

By early 1983, only about 54 percent of the American public endorsed an active role for the United States, with one-third against.

Now, this general trend about security issues generally might suggest that U.S. support for NATO has been seriously eroded over the last 5 years.

As a matter of fact, we did not find that. We found the contrary. We found the American people and their leaders quite capable of making distinctions between involvement and support for security forces in certain parts of the world as opposed to others. We found, once again, and we found this consistently over the last decade, that both leadership support and popular support for the American security commitment in Europe remained strong.

Let me give a couple of examples.

We found that one way to test this is to ask the question of what countries have the highest priority? What countries are considered most important in terms of the United States' vital interests?

Once again, this time referring to the conclusions presented in 1983, we found that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were, once again, among the top five countries, together with our neighbors, Canada and Mexico.

When we went at this question in a slightly different way, how do you feel about a country, do you feel warm or cool, we found the same result.

When we specifically asked the question of support for NATO, as we had done throughout these studies, we found at the beginning of 1983 popular support and leadership support unchanged. Two-

thirds of the public and 86 percent of the leaders registered, once again, strong support for NATO.

When we asked a related question, where would you support the use of American troops in a crisis situation, we found that two-thirds of the public and 92 percent of American leaders would support the use of American troops in the case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

Interestingly, we found that between 1979 and 1983, there was an increase of 11 percent of the public on this question. In other words, 11 percent more of the public would support the use of troops in 1983 than in 1979.

To give you some perspective on this, when we asked the same question, would you support the use of American troops if leftist guerrillas were about to take over the Government of El Salvador, only 10 percent of the leaders and 20 percent of the public would support troops in that case.

We asked this question about use of troops in a crisis situation regularly. We found that the results this last time were really consistent with the results in earlier years.

We found also that, when we compared leadership opinion with popular opinion, American leaders are even more strongly committed to Europe than popular opinion.

On the question of where does the goal of defending allies 'security fall, we found that it was second among American leaders, 82 percent of them favoring it.

We found on the question of use of troops in a crisis situation, 92 percent of American leaders favoring it.

We found that on the overall question going beyond Europe, the question about an active role for the United States in world affairs, 98 percent of American leaders were favoring it.

On an economic, but related, European question, the question of eliminating tariff restrictions, we found 67 percent of American leaders favoring it.

Here, again, these results in 1983 were consistent with what we had found over the past decade and a half; that is to say, American leaders remain even more strongly committed to Europe than popular opinion.

We also found, and in this conclusion I have gone beyond the data of our immediate study, but looking at the United States and looking at Europe, we notice that there is no sharp party division, political party division, on European security issues in this period which contrasts rather sharply with the situation in certain countries in Europe, especially the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to shift gears for just a minute now and look at the question of changes in attitude in Western Europe.

What comes across, in contrast to the continuity in opinion, continuity in trends that one finds in the United States, is some considerable shift both in ideas and political culture in Western Europe, and these shifts have had some definite impact on the thinking of Europeans about specific alliance questions.

There is more neutralist sentiment today than 5 years ago. We found in July of 1983, here relying on the Atlantic Institute Stud-

ies, that a larger number favored neutralism in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom than opposed it.

Despite this, we found that a majority in most countries continued to support NATO, to support their own membership in NATO. This was true in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Norway.

Nevertheless, despite the support of NATO, the will to resist in certain European countries is not overwhelmingly high, and roughly one-quarter of the population said that military force should not be used in any situation.

We found on the issue that so exercised European countries in the early 1980's, the decision to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe, in one of the key countries, Germany, in certain polls, up to three-quarters of the public opposed the deployment. In others it was roughly 50 percent. The precise result varied a great deal according to the formulation of the question.

When the question was formulated in a way linking deployment to NATO, support for deployment went up substantially.

Nevertheless, we found that there was a continuing shift in the direction of some sympathy for unilateral disarmament.

When the question was asked in 1981 about unilateral disarmament, 46 percent of the people in selected European countries were opposed to unilateral disarmament and 33 percent for. Two and a half years later the percentages were reversed.

We also found that on the question of relations with the United States or with the Soviet Union, there was some change, so that by June of 1983, roughly 47 percent in a number of European countries favored a so-called policy of equidistance, equidistance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As an overall conclusion on that key issue that so dominated discussion, the medium range missile deployment, I think we found that there was a widespread view that these new weapons represent more of a threat to many Europeans than a form of protection.

I would make several further comments on trends in Europe.

One of the things that we noted was a feeling of greater insecurity on their part, which contrasted rather sharply with a greater feeling of security here by 1983. The fear of war had definitely increased, and the priority given to arms control had increased.

As one astute observer of the European scene put it, "If an increase in East-West tensions made Europeans feel more vulnerable militarily, the preferred response was to lessen the chances for provocation, not to boost defense."

We also found along the same line that there was some shift in the priorities which Europeans give to United States-European cooperation, a somewhat lower priority to that, as well as a lower priority to maintaining the military balance with the Soviet Union, and a higher priority both to arms control and to maintaining a dialog with the Soviet Union.

We found that Europeans were somewhat schizophrenic. They were confident that the United States would honor American security commitments in Europe; but at the same time, they were very skeptical about current American leadership.

In conclusion on Europe, I would say that one must look at not only the change in ideas and culture, not only the change in attitudes, but one should also look at the change in the actual situation of Western Europe today, compared to 20 or 30 years ago.

I think it is widely recognized in Europe that the military power of the Soviet Union today is enormously greater than it was in 1955 or 1965. Yet, Europeans by and large do not perceive this stronger, more powerful Soviet Union, as a greater threat. By and large, the opposite is true.

How do you explain this?

I would suggest that in the early years after 1945, the Soviet Union was perceived in Europe as a double threat—both a military threat from without and a Communist threat from within.

The internal threat gave the external threat a special character. The link between the two made the Soviet menace take on proportions that Soviet military power alone would not have been able to engender.

The success of the European democracies in establishing political stability and economic stability has, over the last three decades, led to the disappearance of the internal threat. At the same time that the Communist model has lost all credibility as an alternative in Western Europe, the Soviet model has also lost its allure because of the repression documented by Solzhynitsyn and others.

The Soviet Union is, therefore, perceived in Europe today as a Eurasian power, a geopolitical reality sharing the European continent, whose security interests contradict those of Western Europe.

The Soviet system remains a threat to the West, but a threat from the outside, not from the inside. Because the unique conditions of immediate postwar Europe have disappeared, this link between internal and external security has been dissolved.

The Soviet Union has, therefore, become, as one European commentator called it, a more normal adversary. At the same time, the United States, no longer a model for Europe and no longer a superpower with overwhelming superiority, has become a more normal ally for Europe.

Similarly, for Americans, Europeans have become more normal allies as Europe is no longer the exclusive locus of superpower competition.

As Gregory Flynn has commented in concluding the excellent analysis on which I have drawn above, he says:

> The challenge to Western democracies is whether they can make the adjustment necessary to manage the more traditional problem. It is a challenge precisely because the alliance was created to manage a unique problem, an internal and external threat that were one and the same.

Mr. Chairman, before concluding, I would like to make a couple of final comments about attitudes in Europe today.

On the subject of European leadership attitudes, European elite attitudes, we found the opposite of what we found in the United States. We found that, by and large, university graduates—if you take that particular sample in Europe, and many of the European studies are based on samples of European university graduates—are less oriented toward the Atlantic alliance, more skeptical about the United States.

For example, in Germany, a majority, small majority of university graduates are more likely to believe the United States is responsible for international tensions than the Soviet buildup is.

We also found in Europe some definite evidence of a difference in generational attitude. There is a definite attitude of reserve for the Atlantic alliance among the younger generation. Among the younger generation, more are inclined to see the United States as a less equitable society, as weak in human rights. And there you find in that generation a weaker support for NATO and a greater sympathy for neutralism.

In our studies of the United States over the last decade, and particularly the last time around when we gave some particular attention to this question of a generation gap, we didn't find that the gap broke down along generations or along questions of age. It definitely broke down along questions of the level of education.

In our case, we found that, not only the leadership sample that I am quoting here, but university graduates generally were more internationalist, more inclined to support the alliance than the populace as a whole.

So, I would like to conclude this comment on Europe by saying—and here these are very broad generalizations that I am making in my summary—there does appear to be a substantial shift in political ideas, in culture, a change which is more neutralist, more skeptical of the United States, less sympathetic to American society, and somewhat more favorable to developing a third position, separate from the alliance with the United States as a superpower.

Thus I would suggest, this shift in political ideas, in culture, is not a major problem for the United States in terms of its relationship with Western Europe. Although support for internationalism generally has weakened during the last decade, the priority given to Europe and the willingness to defend Europe has not changed substantially. There has not been a massive shift in political ideas, in culture, either among American leaders or among the public at large.

For the United States, I would suggest, the foremost obstacle to maintaining a coherent Atlantic alliance and retaining European confidence in American leadership is institutional, not ideological. The foremost problem for American participation in the alliance is the weakening of American governmental institutions and the weakening of the foreign policy process.

I would just make one comment about what I referred to here when I said that the main problem is institutional.

We all know that there has been an atomization of political power in the United States in the last 10 to 15 years. This diffusion came particularly in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam, and has been characterized by the rise of special interest groups, electoral reforms, the demise of political parties, a weaker executive branch of the Government, and a different balance between the executive branch and the Congress.

This has sometimes resulted in a stalemated society. Leaders of intermediary groups, which have traditionally structured public opinion and given it political effect can no longer be said to automatically represent the views of their groups.

Constituency groups within political parties can no longer be counted on to turn out the base vote for their views. And, despite President Reagan's personal popularity, the United States has become a country without a consistently strong center of popular confidence. We are a nation, as we all know, where the last two Presidents have won elections with an anti-Washington campaign, directed against the very Government that they sought to lead.

These problems of governability are combined with certain decentralizing tendencies which tend to magnify the problem.

We all know that the consensus on American foreign policy which prevailed from 1945 to 1970 on the role of the United States in the world was destroyed after Vietnam. It has not been replaced.

At the same time this was happening, as I said, there has been a change in the role of American public institutions.

As recently as two decades ago, it was possible for the President and Secretary of State, with the concurrence of perhaps the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate, to make a commitment in the foreign policy field and to see it honored.

This is by and large no longer true. It is not only because of a shift in the balance between the Congress and the executive branch. Given the atomization of power within all institutions, the leaders of the Senate and the House are more influenced by their colleagues today than was previously the case.

This shift in the character of official governmental institutions has also been accompanied by a diffusion of leaders, a diffusion of elites active in the private foreign policy establishment and a broadening of the network of private individuals and institutions which interact with the official decisionmaking process.

It is clear that the leaders of the Eastern foreign policy establishment no longer carry the same influence in the United States and can no longer successfully intervene to restore confidence between the United States and Europe.

The point I want to make is that the American foreign policy process has changed a good deal, and this is really more important to relations between the United States and Europe than is any great shift in political ideas, cultural, or also any great shift in control of the American Government from East to West.

The most significant thing is that the policy process has changed as American society has changed. A weaker national government faces problems of credibility. This is true, even though to a lesser extent, perhaps, even with a very strong President backed by a massive electoral mandate, as is it the case with the current President.

There is a different balance between the Executive and Congress, a much broader role for individual Senators and Congressmen in the foreign policy process; a continued dominant role by the electronic media in the process; and all of this has resulted in a high degree of uncertainty, indeed sometimes inconsistency in American foreign policy, both in its formulation and its implementation.

It seems to me that it is this problem that is the greatest current American obstacle to harmonious relations between the United

States and Europe, and not a massive shift in popular or leadership opinions on security or foreign policy questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Rielly's prepared statement follows:]

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European Sub-Committee Hearings of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

"IS NATO STILL THE CENTERPIECE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY?
SHOULD IT BE?"

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:
Leadership and Popular Attitudes in the United States and Europe

Statement prepared by
John E. Rielly
President
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

Washington, D.C.
September 19, 1985

Founded 1922

It is a pleasure to appear before this Committee and to participate in your discussions on the subject "Is NATO Still the Centerpiece of U.S. Foreign Policy? Should it be?" In my paper prepared for this hearing, which I will summarize very briefly here, I will concentrate on two principal issues:

1. What are the principal trends in both popular and leadership attitudes in the United States in recent years on the principal issues involved in the Atlantic alliance?
2. What are the trends in Europe on the same issues?

In addressing these questions, I hope to contribute something that is helpful to you in determining what priority is given to the NATO alliance by both Americans and Europeans today.

The following analysis includes the subject of support for the NATO alliance, for defense expenditures, as well as an examination of attitudes on neutralism, peace and anti-nuclear issues. Brief attention will be given to the question of the impact of generational change on public attitudes. The analysis here focuses primarily on political and security issues, not on economic and financial questions. The data on which the present analysis is based were assembled during the period dominated by the debate on deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe. It does not reflect reaction to the new debate on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

In order to give a better idea of the priority which Americans attach to European security, I would like to begin with a brief comment on support for overall U.S. security efforts.

I. Trends in American Opinion on Security

In the comprehensive survey of American attitudes done by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, we found that the American people at the beginning of 1983 were confident about their military balance with the Soviet Union. About two-thirds of the public and four-fifths of the leaders believed the United States was either equal to or stronger than the Soviet Union in the military

field, a substantial change from four years earlier, when 56% of the public and 29% of the leaders felt the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union militarily. It is this changed perception of the U.S.-Soviet military balance, more than any other single reason, that has led to a reversal of the trend toward higher support for increased defense budgets and growing resistance to the further increases proposed by the Reagan administration. From 1974 to 1978, a 20% shift in favor of increased defense spending in the United States occurred. From the end of 1978 to the end of 1982, support for an expanded military budget dropped by 10%, reversing the trend of previous years. In terms of expanding or curtailing current government programs, 24% favored increasing defense spending and 34% favored cutting back, an exact reversal of the percentages of 1978. The number favoring maintaining defense spending at the current level (beginning of 1983) has remained about the same: 34% in the beginning of 1979 and 36% in the beginning of 1983. Later polls taken by Gallup indicate that this trend has continued through 1983. In mid-September 1983, 37% thought we were spending "too much" on defense, 21% "too little" and 36% "about right."[2] (See Table I)

At the same time that support for an increased defense budget has diminished, concern over the possibility of war has increased. In the Chicago Council study published in early 1979, so few respondents spontaneously mentioned war or nuclear war as foreign policy concerns that the response was not even separately reported. Four years later, 10% mentioned war as a major issue, and the proportion of those concerned about the nuclear arms race doubled. There is evidence that this concern has continued to increase throughout 1983 and, according to the Atlantic Institute study published in November 1983, now includes 45% of the U.S. public.[3]

At the same time, the 1982 results showed strong public support for arms control measures, with three-quarters of the public favoring arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. When asked about a mutual verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons, half the public believed the United States should stop building nuclear weapons only if the Soviet Union also agreed to stop. Nineteen percent of the public believed the United States "should stop building nuclear weapons even if the Soviet Union does not," while 26% of the public agreed that "the United States should continue to build nuclear weapons regardless of what the Soviets do." Fifty-eight percent of the public and 79%

of the leaders said they were for a "freeze right now if the Soviet Union would agree," and 21% of the public favored a freeze "only after the United States builds up its nuclear weapons more." Twelve percent of the public did not favor a freeze under any circumstances.

Finally, we found a continuing erosion of the post World War II consensus that the national interest of the United States requires active participation by the United States in world affairs. Only a bare majority of the public now holds the view that such international activism is best for the future of this country; a third now say it would be better if the United States stayed out of world affairs. Added to this view is the perception that the United States plays a less important and less powerful role as a world leader today compared with the past. The majority of Americans would like to see the United States play a more important role in the future.

These conclusions would seem to suggest that popular opinion in the United States is heading in a direction which would erode support for America's security commitment to Europe and specifically to NATO.

II. American Opinion on European Security

Despite these trends on security issues generally, our analysis of United States popular support for security commitments in Europe suggests a different conclusion.

In measuring the United States' commitment to Europe's security, it is relevant to ask the question of where Europe fits into overall American foreign policy priorities. Which countries are considered to be of greatest interest to the United States, and which are of less interest? In response to the question regarding countries of vital interest to the United States, we found once again that Great Britain and West Germany ranked among the top four in a listing that included United States' neighbors Canada and Mexico. When we asked the question in a different way - how "warmly" people felt about a country as distinct from a vital interest aspect? -, again Great Britain, France and West Germany were among the top five. Whether ranked on a vital interest chart or on a feeling thermometer, America's principal allies in Europe ranked with Canada and Mexico,

plus our principal Asian ally, Japan, as countries most important for the United States. (See Table II)

Support for NATO

On the specific question of support for NATO, the study shows that in the beginning of 1983, two-thirds of the American public (67%) felt that the United States should either keep the commitment at the same level or increase it; 58% favored the same level and 9% favored increasing it. These figures are exactly the same as the beginning of 1979. Similarly, on the question of decreasing the commitment, there was no significant change from those (13%) who felt that way four years ago. The only perceptible change was on support for an increased NATO commitment. In 1978 and 1982, 86% believed the commitment should either be maintained at the same level or increased. In 1982, a drop occurred in the number of leaders[4] who felt the NATO commitment should be increased from 21% in 1978 to 7%. (See Table III)

Another indication of the capacity of both the American public and American leaders to discriminate between involvement in Europe and involvement elsewhere is the response to the question about commitment of American troops in crisis situations. Despite diminished support for a larger defense budget, Americans in general were more willing to support the use of troops in crisis situations at the end of 1982 than they were at the end of 1978. What is most significant is that willingness to support the use of American troops in case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe continues to be stronger and enjoy much broader support than is the case in any other area of the world. Sixty-five percent of the American public and 92% of the American leaders would support the use of American troops in such a situation, representing an increase of eleven percentage points on the popular side during the past four years. Leadership opinion remained unchanged at the high level of 92%.

The next highest level of support relates to Japan, with a significantly lower 4% of the public and 81% of the leaders prepared to support American troops in case of a Soviet attack on Japan. (See Table IV)

Troop support for Europe contrasts sharply with Central America in the limited support for use of troops if "leftist guerrillas were about to defeat the government of El Salvador." Only 20% of the public and 10% of the leaders favored the use of troops in the latter case. This ability to distinguish between involvement in Europe and other parts of the world is not new, but has persisted over the last decade.

Even on the pipeline issue, which led to serious friction between the United States and Europe in 1982, American opinion was surprisingly cautious in criticizing Europe. When the public was asked how we should respond to the Soviet-European natural gas pipeline deal, 87% of the public said "we should let our allies pursue policies they think best," the largest single response. Only 27% favored putting diplomatic pressure on Europeans and a modest 15% favored economic sanctions if other methods did not work.

On the much debated issue of deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe (only asked of the leadership in our study), 67% of the leaders agreed that deployment of the missiles should begin but "stop if the Soviets agree to limit their own missiles in Europe." Only 19% picked the response "go ahead deploying missiles in Europe," and 10% selected not basing missiles there at all. More recent popular polls on the missile issue show similar results, with a November 1983 Harris poll showing 50% in favor of going ahead with the deployment and 43% opposed.[5] The issue did not generate the keen popular interest that was true of Europe. This is reflected in the limited polling on the subject.

On all of the above issues related to Europe, American leadership opinion tends to be more strongly pro-European and more strongly committed to honoring America's commitments in Europe than is popular opinion. In rating foreign policy goals, the goal of defending our allies' security is considered very important by 82% of the leaders, and together with worldwide arms control (86%), is their most popular goal. As noted earlier, 92% of American leaders favor the use of American troops in the case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Ninety-eight percent of American leaders think it is best that the United States continue to take an active part in world affairs; and 67% of the American leaders favor eliminating tariffs and trade restrictions (compared to 22% of the public), an important issue for U.S. relations with Europe. Also, 69% of the American leaders oppose restricting U.S.-Soviet trade; 81% oppose forbidding grain sales

to the Soviet Union and 94% favor cultural and educational exchanges with the Soviet Union. On all of these, American leadership supports, in substantially larger margins than the populace as a whole, current American commitments in Europe. At the same time, leaders' attitudes are more similar to those of European attitudes on a number of issues, especially those related to the Soviet Union.

In concluding this brief discussion of American public and leadership attitudes toward Europe, one should note that attitudes toward Europe do not divide along political party lines. There are sharp differences between the Republican and Democratic parties on U.S. policy in Central America or the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union. But no such sharp party divisions occur on policy toward Western Europe. This contrasts with the situation in a number of European countries - especially the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, where the division on security issues is increasingly along party levels.

Some European analysts argue that partisan political differences on security issues have always existed. In the past, however, security policy was "delimited as a collective interest not as a subject of domestic political battle."[6] What has changed in the past five years is that security policy has once again become "a tool in the struggle for domestic political advantage."[7]

III. Changing Attitudes in Europe

The Council study published in early 1983, and other American analyses, indicate a stability among both American popular and elite attitudes on foreign policy questions and a high degree of continuity with the recent past. A review of selected European survey research, analysis and commentary suggests that the contrary is true in Western Europe on such questions as: support for the NATO alliance, attitudes toward the use of military force, nuclear weapons, neutralism and attitudes toward the United States.

The election results since 1981 in the four largest countries in Europe - France, Italy, Germany and Great Britain - indicate strong continuing support for political parties which favor NATO and the Atlantic alliance. Yet European analysts of varying political perspectives indicate that basic changes in ideas and political

culture have occurred which have grave implications for the Atlantic alliance, including considerable movement in the direction of neutralism in a number of Western European countries. When asked whether Western Europe would be safer if it moved toward neutralism in the East-West conflict, a larger number favored such a move than opposed it in West Germany, Great Britain and France.[8]

Yet most Western Europeans continue to believe that NATO is essential to protect the security of their country. Between 60-70% of the British, Germans, Dutch, Italians and Norwegians who responded to a USIA poll in March of 1981 had expressed support for NATO. (See Table V) But less than a majority were confident that NATO could prevent an attack on Western Europe. Similarly, if Europe should be attacked by the Soviet Union either with nuclear or non-nuclear weapons, the will to resist is not overwhelmingly high. When asked whether military force should ever be used, even in response to an attack by the Soviet Union, a surprisingly high percentage (Britain 20%, Germany 26%, The Netherlands 28%, Italy 33%, France 44%) said it should not be.

IV. Medium-Range Missile Deployment

On the most disputed question of recent years, the 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing and ground-launched cruise missiles beginning in December 1983, it is widely reported that the majority of people in many European countries oppose the deployment. The Federal Republic of Germany, where the issue was most hotly disputed, is illustrative of trends in Northern Europe. In Germany, there was a widespread discrepancy between the assessments of various polling and news-reporting groups. In July 1983, according to a survey by the Second German Television program "Polit-Barometer," three-fourths of the German population was against deployment of medium-range missiles if the negotiations at Geneva failed. According to this view, the decision by the German government to go ahead with the deployment flaunted the views of three-quarters of the German population.

Contrary to this view, one of Germany's noted public opinion analysts, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann at the Allensbach Institute, reports that their surveys of August 1983, while showing a plurality of the German population being against deployment, indicate that the results are much more evenly divided and depend in great part on how the questions are posed.[9]

When the missile question was linked closely to the choice of remaining in NATO or withdrawing from NATO, a more favorable response occurred for deployment. When the question was formulated in the following way: "Assuming we only have the choice of withdrawing from NATO or deploying the new AMERICAN missiles in our country, what should we do? Withdraw from NATO or deploy the new missiles?" the response was that 46% opted to deploy the new missiles and 22% said withdraw from NATO. Although the Allensbach Institute results are considerably more favorable to the position of the present German government, it is nevertheless clear from their own data that a shift has been taking place on issues related to NATO that is not wholly favorable. On the question of whether the German government or the Western governments should begin unilateral disarmament, they note that in July 1981 47% were opposed and 33% were in favor. By August 1983, this was revised, with 46% in favor and 37% opposed. Another shift occurred on attitudes toward close cooperation with the United States or the Soviet Union. Since the end of 1982, the view that Germany should work "equally close with America and Russia" has gained steadily, 47% favoring that in June of 1983, with 42% favoring closer relations with the United States.

Yet despite this growing support for a position of "equidistance" between superpowers, other Allensbach surveys taken at the same time show that there has been no change in the belief on the part of the Germans that the Americans would help them and would risk a war for Germany if the Soviet Union attacked. The figure was 61% in 1958 and 62% in 1983. Despite these ambiguous results, one can conclude that in Northern Europe there is a widespread view that the new weapons represent more of a threat than a form of protection. As long as that is the case, such opposition can be expected to continue.

V. European Trends

Whereas the Chicago Council study indicated that after two years of the Reagan administration the American people felt more confident about their military security, this was not the case in Europe. Over a third of the Europeans in seven countries list a fear of war as their top foreign policy concern; worry about an inadequate defense was last on the list, under 7% in most cases. Europeans seemed far more concerned about ensuring productive arms control talks than about improving defense collaboration among European countries. As one leading American analyst has concluded, "If increasing East-West tensions

have made Europeans feel more vulnerable militarily, the preferred response is to lessen the chances for provocation, not to boost defense."[10]

There is further evidence that Europeans are shifting their priorities on security matters. The recent Atlantic Institute study indicated that "where previously effective cooperation between Europe and the United States and a military balance with the Soviet Union were the highest priority items in many countries, now it is productive arms controls talks and/or continued dialogue with the Soviet Union which dominate at least as much and usually more."[11] (See Table VI)

Current opinion polls do not support the view sometimes expressed in the press that Europeans have become uniformly negative about the United States. In polls taken in 1981-82, respect for the United States outweighs by two to one hostile or unfavorable attitudes. Approximately 50% of the people in each of the major nations of Britain, France, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands are confident that, if their security were threatened by the Soviet Union, the United States would come to their defense and risk retaliation on the United States. If Europeans have increasing doubts about the leadership of the United States government, this does not necessarily mean they believe the United States is no longer committed to the defense of Europe's security. But concern about U.S. leadership is growing - and is reflected in diminishing confidence in the United States. (See Table VII)

To go beyond conclusions suggested by specific survey research data, it would appear that, of the last four United States administrations, only the Nixon and Ford administrations enjoyed the confidence of Europeans. A principal reason for their popularity was that they followed a European balance of power approach to international politics and supported a policy of detente with the Soviet Union. The architect of that policy (and in the Ford administration the implementor as well) was Henry Kissinger, a man whose origins were in Europe.

Both presidents who followed Ford eschewed this approach to diplomacy. Europeans were appalled by the neo-Wilsonian moralism of Jimmy Carter, who condemned power politics and sought to influence internal Soviet behavior through his human rights policy. Carter left an impression of weakness both in America and Europe. President Ronald Reagan came to power partly to restore American power in the world. But like Carter, he also rejected balance of power diplomacy, this time in favor of a demonic world view which presupposed the Soviet Union as "an

evil empire" which is the source of all international instability. Europeans originally welcomed the reassertion of American power under Reagan. But today, although they respect American power, they fear American aggressiveness. They disagree with the Reagan administration because it rejects detente - still a policy Europeans strongly support. But even more important than their disagreement with specific Reagan policies and their doubts about the judgement of American governmental leaders is the changed situation in the Europe of 1985 from that of 1955 or 1965.

It is widely recognized in Europe that the military power of the Soviet Union is enormously greater in 1985 than in 1955 or 1965. Yet Europeans do not perceive this more powerful Soviet Union as a greater threat. The opposite is true. How does one explain this? In the early years after 1945, the Soviet Union was perceived in Europe as a double threat "both a military threat from without and a Communist threat from within." "The internal threat gave the external threat a special character: the link between the two made the Soviet menace take on proportions that Soviet military power would not have been able to engender."[12] The success of European democracies in establishing political stability and economic stability has led to a disappearance of the internal threat. At the same time that the Communist model has lost all credibility as an alternative in Western Europe, the Soviet model has also lost its allure because of the repression documented by Solzhenitsyn and others. The Soviet Union is therefore perceived in Europe today as a Eurasian power, a "geopolitical reality" sharing the European continent, whose security interests contradict those of Western Europe.[13] The Soviet system remains a threat to the West, but a threat from the outside, not from the inside.

Because the unique conditions of immediate postwar Europe have disappeared, the "link between internal and external security has been dissolved." The Soviet Union has therefore become "a more normal adversary." At the same time, the United States, no longer a model for Europe and no longer a superpower with overwhelming superiority, has become "a more normal ally" for Europe. Similarly for Americans, Europeans have become more normal allies, as Europe is no longer the exclusive locus of superpower competition. As Gregory Flynn has concluded in his excellent analysis cited above, "The challenge to Western democracies is whether they can make the adjustment necessary to manage the more traditional problem, it is a challenge precisely because the alliance was created to manage a unique problem: an internal and external threat that were one and the same."[14]

VI. European Elite Attitudes

According to many European analysts, European elites are increasingly skeptical about, or in some cases hostile to, the United States; just the opposite of American elite attitudes toward Europe. In the United States,[15] elites remain not only substantially more internationalist in outlook, but the high priority given to Europe by the public is even greater in the case of elites. Defending our allies' security was second in a list of elite priorities (behind arms control); and 92% of American leaders would support the use of American troops in case of a Soviet invasion of Europe. A number of European commentators suggest that the opposite is true in Europe. Here, there is evidence that the higher the educational level, the more likely people are to be skeptical about the United States, about its foreign policy objectives (especially the objective of maintaining world peace) and about the capacity of the United States to show good judgement in responding to current world problems. The International Herald Tribune/Atlantic Institute surveys[16] in 1982 and 1983 suggested that university-educated people in Germany are more likely to believe that the United States military buildup and the United States policies are responsible for international tensions than the Soviet military buildup. One analyst of European opinion has stated that, "In the realm of political ideas as held at elite levels, the trans-atlantic gulf is widening dramatically."[17]

VII. Generational Differences

It is now commonly believed that there is a substantial difference in view on the Atlantic alliance between the generation in Europe which received its university education since the mid-1960s and those which preceded it. The attitudes of what is generally referred to as "the successor generation" are considered to be more reserved toward United States society, and toward American leadership in particular. Although the United States is still more highly esteemed and considered more reliable than the Soviet Union, the former is seen as weak in human rights performance and as less just and equitable than many European societies. This generation is more inclined than its predecessors to look for a third option between the United States and the Soviet Union. As indicated in the accompanying Table VIII, this new generation continues to support NATO, although less heavily than its predecessors. This contrast in attitudes is

most characteristic of the university-educated people. Among the younger generation of university-educated Europeans, there is likely to be less support for increased defense efforts, more opposition to nuclear weapons and more sympathy for neutralism. Generalization about a generation gap cannot be uniformly applied, and most observers would agree with the conclusion of a leading student of the problem, "the generation gap appears to be greatest in West Germany and Italy, and smallest in Britain and France."[18]

Contrary to European analysts of the European scene, we did not find pronounced differences in American opinion along generational lines. On both direct support for NATO and on America's top foreign policy priorities, there was no sharp generational dividing line. On almost all questions, the biggest differentiating factor was not age, but level of education. University graduates tended to be most international in outlook and this factor was more important in determining one's outlook than either age or geography.[19]

CONCLUSION

I would like to note one further difference between American attitudes and those in Europe. In Europe, there appears to be a substantial change in political ideas and culture, a change which is more neutralist, more skeptical of association with the United States, less sympathetic to American society and more favorable to developing a third position, separate from alliance with the superpowers.

This is not the major problem in the United States in terms of its relationship with Western Europe. Although support for internationalism has weakened during the past decade, the priority given to Europe and the willingness to defend Europe has not. There has not been a massive change in political ideas and culture among the American elite or the public. In the United States, the foremost obstacle to maintaining the Atlantic alliance and retaining European confidence in American leadership is institutional, not ideological. The foremost problem for American participation in the alliance is the weakening of American governmental institutions and the unraveling of the foreign policy process.

- The Atomization of Politics

The United States has experienced a diffusion of political power in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam which has been characterized by the rise of special

interest groups, electoral reforms, the demise of political parties, a weaker Executive Branch of government, and a different balance between the Executive Branch and the Congress. The result has been a stalemated society whose political institutions face a two-edged crisis of governability and credibility. Leaders of intermediary groups which have traditionally structured public opinion and given it political effect can no longer be said to automatically represent the views of their groups. Constituency groups within the political parties can no longer be counted on to turn out the base vote for their views. Despite President Reagan's personal popularity, the United States has become a country without any center of popular confidence, a nation whose last two presidents have won elections with an "anti-Washington" campaign, directed against the very government they sought to lead. These problems of governability and credibility are combined with decentralizing tendencies which magnify the problem.

- The Decentralization of the Foreign Policy Process

The consensus which prevailed in the United States from 1945 to 1970 on the role of America in the world was destroyed in the wake of American involvement in Vietnam and has not been replaced. There has also been a sharp change in the role and effectiveness of various institutions in the American foreign policy process. As recently as two decades ago, it was possible for the President and the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of perhaps the majority and minority leaders of the House of Representatives and the Senate, to make a commitment in the foreign policy field and to see it honored. This is no longer true. It is not only because of the shift in the balance of power between the White House and the Congress. Given the atomization of power within all institutions, the leaders of the Senate and the House have far more limited influence with their colleagues on any issue. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or Armed Services Committee or his counterpart in the House often has little influence over the final actions of his committee.

The change in character of official governmental institutions and the decline of their authority has been accompanied by a diffusion of elites active in the private foreign policy establishment, a broadening of the network of private individuals and institutions which interact with the official foreign policy network. The leaders of the Eastern foreign policy establishment no longer carry the same influence in the United States and can no longer successfully intervene to restore confidence and trust between America and Europe.

What is significant about these trends is that the American foreign policy process has changed a good deal, not primarily because a group of people from the West Coast are running it today, as distinct from people from the East, and not because of any great shift in political ideas and culture. The most significant thing is that the policy process itself has changed as American society has changed. A weaker national government is facing problems of governability and credibility. This is true, though to a lesser extent perhaps, even with a "strong" president backed by a massive electoral mandate, as is the case with Ronald Reagan. There is a different balance of power between the Executive and Congress, a much broader role for individual Senators and Congressmen in the foreign policy process, and a continued dominant role by the electronic media in the foreign policy process. All this has resulted in a high degree of uncertainty and inconsistency in American foreign policy, both in the formulation and the implementation. It is this problem that is the greatest current American obstacle to harmonious relations between the two continents, not a shift in public opinion or elite attitudes on security questions.

TABLE I

Sentiments on defense spending -- The Public -- 1982

1982, 1978 and 1974 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations results compared to Gallup Poll trend. Gallup did not collect data for the period 1960-68. The CCFR question was slightly different: 1) Cut back; 2) Keep same; 3) Expand

	1960	1969	1971	Feb. 1973	Sept. 1973	1974	CCFR 1974	1976	1977	CCFR 1978	CCFR 1982
1. Too much	18%	52%	49%	42%	46%	44%	32%	36%	23%	16%	24%
2. About right	45	31	31	40	30	32	47	32	40	45	52%
3. Too Little	21	8	11	8	13	12	13	22	27	32	21

TABLE II

Perceptions of U.S. vital interests -- 1982

"Many people believe that the United States has a vital interest in certain areas of the world and not in other areas. That is, certain countries of the world are important to the U.S. for political, economic or security reasons. I am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me whether you feel the U.S. does or does not have a vital interest in that country".

U.S. Has Vital Interest

	Does		Does Not		Don't Know	
	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders
Japan	82%	97%	9%	2%	9%	1%
Canada	82	95	10	4	8	1
Great Britain	80	97	11	2	9	1
Saudi Arabia	77	93	10	6	13	1
West Germany	76	98	13	1	11	1
Israel	75	92	15	8	10	*
Mexico	74	98	16	1	10	1
Egypt	66	90	19	9	15	1
People's Republic of China	64	87	19	12	17	1
France	58	84	25	15	17	1

*less than one-half of 1%

Thermometer ratings for Countries -- The Public

"Next I'd like you to rate the same countries on this feeling thermometer. If you feel neutral toward a country, give it a temperature of 50 degrees. If you have a warm feeling toward a country, give it a temperature higher than 50 degrees. If you have a cool feeling toward a country, give it a temperature lower than 50 degrees."

	Mean Temperature
Canada	74°
Great Britain	68°
France	60°
Mexico	60°
West Germany	59°
Israel	55°
Italy	55°
Brazil	54°
Japan	53°
Poland	52°

TABLE III

Asked of Everyone:

"Some people feel that NATO, the military organization of Western Europe and the United States has outlived its usefulness, and that the United States should withdraw militarily from NATO. Others say that NATO has discouraged the Russians from trying a military take-over in Western Europe. Do you feel we should increase our commitment to NATO, keep our commitment what it is now, decrease our commitment but still remain in NATO, or withdraw from NATO entirely".

Public as a whole 1982		Age / Generation			
		18-28	29-42	43-60	61-91
9%	Increase commitment	10%	11%	8%	8%
58%	Keep commitment what it is	58%	58%	64%	51%
11%	Decrease our commitment	11%	11%	11%	11%
4%	Withdraw entirely	3%	2%	4%	6%
18%	Not sure	18%	18%	13%	23%

TABLE IV

U. S. response to crisis situations -- 1982

"There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if:"

Asked of opponents of sending troops on the asterisked items:

"I am going to read the circumstances under which you said you would oppose sending U.S. troops. On this card are levels of U.S. involvement that might be appropriate under these circumstances. For each situation, tell me how far you feel the U.S. should be willing to go."

Situations:		Opposed to sending troops		Do nothing		Try to negotiate		Refuse to trade		Send military supplies		Send troops		Don't know	
		Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders
Soviets invade Japan	1978	58%	19%	13%	1%	20%	6%	3%	1%	9%	9%	42%	81%	1 3%	2%
	1982	49	22									51	78		
Arabs cut off oil to U.S.*	1978	64	71	5	1	34	37	12	27	1	1	36	29	12	5
	1982	61	64	4	-	33	47	15	26	2	4	39	36	10	1
N. Korea invades S. Korea	1978	79	55	24	6	28	13	3	2	9	30	21	45	15	4
	1982	78	50									22	50		
Leftist guerillas about to defeat government of El Salvador*	1982	80	90	18	15	29	43	7	7	11	36	20	10	15	2
Iran invades Saudi Arabia	1982	75	46									25	54		
Arabs invade Israel	1978	78	69	14	2	38	27	3	1	8	35	22	31	15	4
	1982	70	53									30	47		
China invades Taiwan	1978	80	82	25	12	27	44	5	5	7	17	20	18	16	4
	1982	82	85									18	15		
Soviets invade Poland	1982	69	94	10	10	27	40	13	49	9	11	31	6	13	3
Soviets invade West Europe*	1978	46	8	9	-	16	3	2	-	6	4	54	92	13	1
	1982	35	8	5	-	14	5	4	2	4	4	65	92	9	1
Soviets invade China	1982	79	94									21	6		

TABLE V

GROWING NEUTRALISM

Question: Some have said that Western Europe would be safer if it moved toward neutralism in the East-West conflict. Others argue that such a move would be dangerous. Would you, yourself, favor or oppose a move toward neutralism in Western Europe?

	Favor	Oppose
West Germany	57%	43%
Netherlands	53	32
Great Britain	45	42
France	43	41
United States	41	45

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization (U.S. and European affiliates), for *Newsweek* magazine, January 1983. N between 500 and 754 in each country.

Question: All things considered, do you think it is better for (this country) to belong to NATO, that is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or would it be better for us to get out of NATO and become a neutral country?

	Better to belong		Better to get out	
	March 1981	July 1981	March 1981	July 1981
West Germany	67%	64%	14%	18%
Great Britain	67	59	20	29
Netherlands	62	56	17	25
Italy	60	49	30	42
France*	45	33	40	51

*In France, the question referred to the Atlantic alliance instead of NATO.

Source: Surveys by the United States Information Agency, latest that of July 1981.

Table VI


WHAT THE POLL FOUND:
Results of Sept. 1982
Results of Oct. 1983
• Fewer people in the industrialized countries believe the security of the West now rests upon cooperation between Western Europe and the United States.
BRITAIN FRANCE ITALY JAPAN NETH. NORWAY SPAIN U.S. W.GERMANY
• An increasing number of people would prefer to see greater contacts and dialogue with the Soviet Union.
BRITAIN FRANCE ITALY JAPAN NETH. NORWAY SPAIN U.S. W.GERMANY
Figures show percentage of respondents in each country. Japan polled on the subjects for the first time.
International Herald Tribune

TABLE VII

Still Some Respect But Diminished Confidence in U.S.

	Great Britain	France	West Germany	Italy	Neth-erlands	Norway	Belgium	Average
Opinion of the United States (1981):								
Favorable	52%	56%	65%	67%	55%	55%	63%	59%
Unfavorable	38	25	20	28	36	34	29	30
Respect for the United States (1972):								
Great/considerable	70%	81%	82%	80%	–	–	–	–
Little/very little	19	16	14	17	–	–	–	–
Respect for the United States (1981):								
Great/considerable	54%	62%	56%	75%	49%	71%	52%	60%
Little/very little	42	23	28	22	43	20	40	31
Confidence in the ability of the U.S. to deal responsibly with world problems (1981):								
Great deal/fair amount	47%	46%	43%	61%	39%	41%	60%	48%
Not very much/none	49	41	42	35	52	47	32	43

SOURCE: U.S. International Communication Agency

TABLE VIII

Figure 1

PERCENT OF BEST-EDUCATED WHO FAVOR NATO OR NEUTRALITY



Source: U.S. International Communication Agency, March 1981.

FOOTNOTES

1. In discussing both popular and elite opinion in the United States, I am drawing principally on the study published by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in March 1983 entitled "American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1983", editor John E. Rielly. The conclusions and analysis in this study are based on data collected for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations by the Gallup Organization in October-December 1982. If other trends have emerged during 1983 that have diverged significantly from the conclusions in this study, they are noted that the source cited accordingly.

2. Gallup Poll (September 16-19, 1983).

3. The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs Louis Harris Poll (report released November 28, 1983). The fieldwork for this survey was conducted between September 10 - November 4, 1983. The citations in this paper are both from the summary issued by the Atlantic Institute and the articles by Charles Mitchelmore appearing in the International Herald Tribune (November 29, 1983).

4. In the previous section I have focused principally on popular opinion - not American leadership opinion. Our study was a comparative study of both popular and leadership opinion. In this and the following sections some analysis of leadership attitudes is included. The leaders survey included 341 leaders drawn heavily from the top leadership of government, industry, banking, communications, labor, churches, research institutes and universities.

5. Harris Poll (November 1983).

6. Gregory Flynn, "Politics, Publics and Changing Images of Security", Public Images of Western Security (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1985), p. 13.

7. Ibid.

8. Gallup Organization Survey, Newsweek magazine (January 1983); see Table IV.

9. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, article first appearing in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (September 1983); later published in different form in Encounter magazine.

10. William Schneider, "Elite and Public Opinion: The Alliance's New Fissure", Public Opinion magazine (February/March 1983).

11. Atlantic Institute Poll summary (November 1983) p. VII.

12. Edwina Moreton, "Images of the Soviet Union: A More Typical Adversary", Public Images of Western Security, ed. Gregory Flynn (Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1985) p. 23.

13. Ibid.

14. Gregory Flynn, "Politics, Publics and Changing Images of Security', Public Images of Western Security, op. cit., p. 13. In my analysis in this section I have drawn heavily on two essays by Moreton and Flynn cited in this volume.

15. Quoted in Steven Haseler, "Demise of Atlanticism: European Elites and NATO", Public Opinion magazine (March 1983).

16. The American elite attitudes summarized here are based on the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations 1982 survey of 432 American leaders drawn from the top ranks of all professions. The elites referred to in European analyses cited here are generally university graduates and are not precisely comparable.

17. Haseler artice cited - France would appear to be a significant exception to the general European trend. Here elite attitudes, especially toward the Soviet Union and nuclear issues, currently run counter to those in other European countries, especially the Federal Republic of Germany. See Stanley Hoffman, "Dateline Paris" (French-American Foundation, December 1983).

18. Stephen F. Szabo, "The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Post War Europeans" (London: Butterworth, 1983). Also see article by Stephan Szabo, "The Successor Generation in Europe", Public Opinion (February/March 1983).

19. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations study (1983).

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much, indeed.

I have several questions to ask you about the polls that you used in your report, as well as some general questions.

I know that there is always controversy about every poll that I have taken, and I think that your efforts here should be analyzed. We thank you very much. I will ask those questions of you later.

Our next witness is Mr. Earl Ravenal. Mr. Ravenal has had a varied and noted career. From the early beginnings as president of an industrial corporation, Mr. Ravenal has served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has been a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Institute for Policy Studies, and the Rockefeller Foundation's Bellagio Study and Conference Center.

He is a senior fellow of the Cato Institute of Washington, DC, and a distinguished research professor of international affairs at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He has also lectured at over 40 American and foreign universities and academies. Mr. Ravenal earned his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins' school for Advanced International Studies.

Mr. Ravenal has published over 140 articles in magazines such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Atlantic Monthly, and The New Republic.

We welcome Mr. Ravenal to the Senate.

STATEMENT OF EARL RAVENAL, SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Mr. RAVENAL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am very pleased to be invited to contribute to the Senate's consideration of the current status of the NATO alliance.

My remarks this morning will address the essence of America's commitment to the defense of Europe and the source of NATO's crisis.

I would like to put into the record my longer article, in the summer issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, "Europe Without America: The Erosion of NATO."

Senator PRESSLER. Yes.

Mr. RAVENAL. The title of this hearing is "The Crisis of Will in the NATO Alliance." I have entitled my remarks, "NATO: A Crisis of Will or Situation?"

This is not a quibble. With due respect for the enlightening statistical researches of John Rielly's Chicago Council on Foreign Relations into the state of the American popular and elite mind regarding the integrity of our military commitments to various foreign countries, the fundamental problem in America's relation to NATO is not a matter of opinion or will. It is not a matter of what Americans think of Europeans or the propriety of defending them. To consider the problem in these terms is to become fixated on surface phenomena.

That surface is composed of popular demonstrations in Europe, anti-nuclear and anti-American; recriminations by allied leaders over American expressions and declarations that are either too bellicose or too reticent; ruffled feathers over alleged failures of consultation; angry editorials in nationalistic journals on both sides of the Atlantic; the rage of American right-wing pundits over restrictions that Europeans would put on our military actions in pursuit of our own interests, and over our allies' attempts to cultivate the Soviets despite our exhortations to join in pressures and punishments.

All of this supposedly has led to a growing reluctance of Americans to intervene in the defense of common interests in Europe, a desire to return, if not precisely to some recognizable form of isolationism, at least to characteristic American unilateralism, escaping from the trammels of coalition defense to a singular preoccupation with, say, the Persian Gulf, the sea lanes, and Central America.

These perceptions are not entirely false. But to describe them as a "crisis of will" is profoundly misleading. It invites remedies that are as superficial and fictitious as the causal metaphor. "Will" implies sheer voluntarism, pure intention. It is a subjective psychological phenomenon. Correspondingly, a "crisis of will" implies that America's problems with NATO, or NATO's with America, are attributable to a lack of desire or determination to do the things that everyone knows ought to be done and can be done in our own interest, and therefore not just a deplorable failure, but a gratuitous failure, a remediable failure.

The implication is that all we need to do is to summon the requisite political will—that all purpose solvent—or perhaps a variant of the same thing, "leadership," usually presidential leadership. More than that, to some, such as Norman Podhoretz, the editor of Commentary, the absence of the requisite will is tantamount to a "failure of nerve," the persistence of that overworked diagnosis, "Vietnam Syndrome"; indeed, it is evidence of a deeper moral decay, ominously reminiscent of the late 1930's, and in turn attributable to America's infatuation with libertarianism and libertinism.

WHAT IS POLITICAL WILL?

But "will," as applied not to a single individual but to a complex polity, society, and economy, functioning as a decisionmaking system, has no meaning. In this context, "will," even if you want to call it that, must represent the capacity of a political-social-eco-

nomic system to generate resources and to allow an administration to place them on the altar of extended deterrence and foreign intervention. These are objective and tangible determinations, not subjective psychological quirks, and they tell whether an American administration can credibly extend our military protection to other countries and wield the threat of military intervention in far-off parts of the world.

WHAT MOTHERS IN AN ALLIANCE: WILL OR SOMETHING ELSE?

Nor does the probability of our providing this material and political support rest on public opinion, as such, however meticulously sounded and sampled. For plumbing American support for NATO is not a matter of asking first order questions, such as: "Do you want to continue to defend Europe?" It is not the first order effects of alliance that will bring about its rejection, and rarely soon. Rather, it is the second order effects of our commitment to an alliance, particularly a critical and significant alliance such as NATO, that matter: such effects, on the cost side of the ledger, as taxes, conscription, inflation, high interest rates, and big and intrusive government; and, on the risk side of the ledger, as nuclear confrontations and other crises of intervention. These second order effects, especially those of cost, are often only tenuously associated, or not at all associated, with the alliance, though they are objectively caused by it. Yet it is these second order effects of our foreign and military policy that may be rejected by our society; and because the effects are entailed by our assumption of alliance, their rejection may indirectly bring the continuance of alliance into doubt.

What is important, therefore, in the disposition of large and momentous relationships such as NATO is not what people think or say they would like to see happen, but how our system works. So the appropriate task for scholars and for legislators is not to ask a sample of Americans whether they want to continue to support NATO, but rather to identify what is entailed by our commitment, what we have to do to implement the alliance, what its consequences are for our economy, society, and polity, and then to ask whether our system can incur and is going to incur those costs and consequences.

Some would say that NATO not only depends on, but virtually consists of, the defensive guarantee, including the threat of nuclear escalation, provided by its principal guarantor, the United States. That is perhaps an exaggeration, but it suggests that NATO will stand or fall according to whether the American political-social-economic system can and will bear the costs and risks inherent in the American defensive guarantee to Europe.

For the commitment to Europe presents the United States with a choice between high costs, associated with the confident defense of Europe with conventional forces, and severe risks, attributable to reliance on the earlier use of nuclear weapons. The direction in which this tension is resolved, by any particular American administration, is not rigidly determined. To some extent, cost can be transmitted into additional risk, and risk can be transformed into more cost. That is what is meant by raising or lowering the nuclear

threshold. But, as long as the United States is committed to Europe, the choice itself is inescapable.

At the very least, cost and risk are inevitable components of any assessment of America's role in the defense of Europe, and they are the most formidable reasons that could be presented for American withdrawal from Europe.

In other words, it is in terms of the entailments of alliance, and the requisites of alliance, the things we have to do or try to do to cope with those entailments, that NATO will survive or dissolve. Ironically, even if we meet the requisites of alliance, we incur irreducible danger and expense to ourselves; and, to the extent that we escape the danger and the expense, we unmistakably convey the implausibility of our protection of Europe.

WHAT MUST WE DO TO DEFEND EUROPE?

Thirty-six years after the foundation of NATO, the defense of Western Europe still rests on the proposition that an American president will invite the destruction of our cities and the incineration of a hundred million of our citizens to repel a Soviet incursion or resist a Soviet ultimatum in Western Europe. On its face, America's war plan is the first use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, to defend Europe. What we are talking about is extended deterrence, and, in turn, extended deterrence entails the strategic defense initiative and counterforce.

And yet, our extended deterrence is widely distrusted by Europeans. It is not credible. The root of the problem is that America, the alliance guarantor, hoping to escape the destruction of nuclear war, will seek to put time between the outbreak of war in Europe and the decision to escalate to nuclear weapons, and will take whatever advantage it can of its distance from Europe.

Europeans already suspect this. Virtually every American strategic move—up, down or sideways—has evoked the specter of decoupling in one or another of its forms, either the avoidance of a nuclear response altogether or the attempt to confine even a nuclear conflict to the European theater.

This is not something that began suddenly when President Reagan said, "I can see where you could have the exchange of tactical nuclear weapons against troops in the field without bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button." The doubts had been sown long before that in a series of American moves dating back to the multilateral nuclear force [MLF], the emphasis on flexible response in the Kennedy-McNamara administration, the Schlesinger doctrine of 1974, the interest in mininukes such as the neutron bomb, and even the introduction of intermediate-range nuclear weapons such as the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missiles. Though these weapons may enhance coupling by perfecting the essential link of theater nuclear weapons, they may also allow the restriction of nuclear conflict to Europe.

More recently, and currently, President Reagan's strategic defense initiative, designed to protect American society from Soviet missiles, has stirred European concern that the United States could afford a "Fortress America" mentality and ignore forward defense of Europe.

HAS THE U.S. ALREADY DECOUPLED?

These matters, though they rest on abstract and contingent calculations, are not in the realm of theory or theology. Future hypothetical events affect present military dispositions, the nerve of contestants in crises, the course of diplomacy within the alliance, and the coherence of the Atlantic strategic community. In both logic and fact, the United States has already implicitly decoupled from the defense of Europe in those contingencies that the alliance was established to meet. These are inevitable and objective facts, these divergencies between the perspectives of Europe and the United States. America's interest at the periphery is to avoid being drawn integrally into a conflict that could otherwise be localized in Europe. To the Americans, Europe is an early warning of Soviet intentions in the world and a temporary barrier; but to the Europeans, of course, it is all there is.

Henry Kissinger was very clear about these matters when he addressed a private gathering of American and European strategists in Brussels in September 1979. He said:

> Perhaps even today, but surely in the 1980's, the United States will no longer be in a strategic position to reduce a Soviet counter blow against the United States to tolerable levels. . . . If my analysis is correct, "we must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide. . . . And therefore, I would say, which I might not say in office, that European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean or if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization.

And yet, the destruction of civilization. certainly of our own homeland, is exactly what we have undertaken to do in the defense of the alliance.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE

Thus, the American strategic guarantee to defend Western Europe can scarcely be evaluated without examining the logic of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence, as opposed to central or primary deterrence, is the attempt to discourage attacks or pressures against nations and peoples other than ourselves by threatening the use of nuclear weapons.

What are the requisites of extended deterrence? It can be argued that to validate extended deterrence requires the practical invulnerability of our own society to Soviet attack. This is so an American president can persuade others that he would risk an attack on our homeland in the act of spreading our protective mantle over Western Europe and other parts of the world.

If we were to seek societal invulnerability, we would have to work through both our defensive and our offensive strategic systems. In other words, first we would need strategic defense. As a second condition of societal invulnerability, we would have to have in reserve, after any of the earlier stages of a protracted nuclear exchange, a redundancy of survivable nuclear weapons. Finally, we would need nuclear counterforce—that is, specifically, hard target kill—so that we could strike Soviet missiles in their silos in a damage limiting attack.

COUNTERFORCE

Thus, our drift to counterforce is not perverse or accidental, as some critics would represent it. Ultimately, counterforce, just as strategic defense, proceeds from our adherence to alliance commitments, particularly to NATO. And yet, the requirement for counterforce has two grave liabilities: It is open-ended and it is highly unstable. It is unstable because, in order to have its intended effect, it must be preemptive, and indeed counterforce and first nuclear strike are mutually dependent.

Why would the United States have opted for this demanding and destabilizing strategy? The compelling motive for counterforce, as well as strategic defense, is damage limitation, that is, limiting the damage to the United States in a nuclear war, and this motive, in turn, springs from the requirements of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence, of course, is one of the requisites of our commitment to the alliance.

Now, to list and to demonstrate the requisites of alliance is not to argue for any of these implementing measures. Quite the contrary, it is to show how our weapons and our strategic doctrines, far from being mindless, are closely dictated by our alliance responsibilities. And, conversely, our willingness to protect allies rises and falls generally with our ability to protect our own society from nuclear attack and, more specifically, with the prospective viability of counterforce. If there is any explicit doubt—technical, economic, political—that we will achieve that invulnerability or that we should pursue counterforce (and I believe that there is such a doubt), there is implicit doubt that our extensive nuclear commitments, especially to Western Europe, can survive.

These risks that stem from our extended deterrence inspire periodic attempts to avoid the contingent nuclear destruction of our homeland. Such an attempt is the case against the first use of nuclear weapons, as expressed in the notable article in 1982 by McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, in "Foreign Affairs."

But if one is committed, as are Bundy and his fellow authors, both to defend Europe and to avoid the extension of conflict to our homeland, one must try to reconcile these awkward objectives. And thus, what is crucial is that the proposal of no first use of nuclear weapons, designed to save the United States and its society from nuclear attack, is conditioned upon the acquisition of an adequate conventional defense.

A HIGH-CONFIDENCE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE

But this reflexive option of conventional defense cannot mean just any conventional effort. It must mean the high-confidence defense of Europe with conventional arms. And it cannot just mean to exhort or prescribe that the United States and its allies must do more to guarantee the integrity of Western Europe. There is the further burden of predicting that this will happen. Therefore, in order to determine the feasibility and, hence, the predictive probability of a conventional defense option, we must have a bill of costs.

I judge, in terms of forces, that the American commitment to NATO, out of a total of 21 active ground divisions prescribed by the

Reagan administration for 1986, requires 11⅔ divisions, and, in budgetary terms, the NATO commitment, out of the $314 billion originally requested for defense by the Reagan administration for fiscal year 1986, accounts for $134 billion.

This is 42.5 percent of the amount originally requested for defense by the Reagan administration. Given a reasonable projection of current cost growth over the next 10 years, Europe will cost the United States $2.2 trillion. The appropriate question is whether even those resources will be forthcoming, let alone the greater ones required for self-sufficient conventional defense of Europe.

Moreover, comparing the relative burdens of the United States and its allies is not the point. And so, even adjusting these burdens—so-called burden shifting—would not be the solution. The question has always been whether the United States is getting its own money's worth out of its forward strategy, and would be getting its money's worth even after some putative redistribution of burdens. That is a question of the basic economy of alliance.

Thus, the crisis of NATO resides not in our will, but in our situation. If we would resolve this crisis, and if we would eliminate or sharply curtail the risks and costs to us, we must do much more than tinker with the modalities of alliance, the mechanisms of consultation, a few wonder weapons and, the manipulation of the nuclear threshold. We must consider the progressive attenuation of our alliance support and commitment. We must come to terms with a Europe without America, and an America without Europe.

[The following article was subsequently supplied for the record:]

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EUROPE WITHOUT AMERICA: THE EROSION OF NATO

Earl C. Ravenal

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Earl C. Ravenal

EUROPE WITHOUT AMERICA: THE EROSION OF NATO

The end of Hitler's New Order in Europe in May 1945 ushered in a new order in America's relationship to Europe. The arrangements that were designed, debated and put in place during the following four years endure to this day. They are part of the world into which the present generation of foreign policy practitioners and commentators were professionally and intellectually born; and they shape the perceptions and limit the imagination of the general public. NATO, in particular, is a fixture in the international political and strategic firmament. The present Atlantic relationship is not without flaws, but since its framework has the aspect of a given, critiques fix on surface phenomena and proximate factors—apparent weaknesses or apparent strengths. Improvements are considered within the given framework, not as alternatives to it. Even the flaws are felt as mere irritants, inspiring only enraged political opposition or petulant geopolitical daydreams.

In the past few years, the tides of discontent have been lapping at the base of the Atlantic alliance. And there has formed a sort of unholy and unintended coalition of the European left (for example, the German Green Party and the radical wing of the Social Democratic Party, or the left wing of the British Labour Party) and the American right. The outbursts of one nourish the resentments of the other. Indeed, if NATO ever is washed away, the cause may be seen to be the feuding of these transatlantic factions.

But, after almost four decades, it is time to gain more perspective on the architecture of NATO and to do some wholesale reckoning of NATO's situation. For there is another, structural, reason for NATO's present debility, which is at the root of the attitudes of the factions of left and right on both sides

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of the Atlantic: the danger and yet the incredibility of the American military guarantee of Europe, including our "nuclear umbrella." The cracks in America's guarantee in turn proceed from a tension inherent in the American assumption of this strategic commitment to Europe 36 years ago.

The commitment to Europe presents the United States with a choice between high, and perhaps unsupportable, costs associated with the confident conventional defense of Europe, and unassumable risks attributable to reliance on the earlier use of nuclear weapons. The direction in which this tension is resolved, by any particular American administration, is not rigidly determined; to some extent, cost can be transmuted into additional risk, and risk can be transformed into mere cost. (That is what is meant by "lowering" or "raising" the nuclear threshold.) But as long as the United States is committed to Europe, the choice itself is inescapable.

The Europeans have a somewhat parallel choice: costly generation of sufficient conventional forces, or acquisition or expansion of their own national nuclear arsenals, with more resolute and risky doctrines of employment. But there is an obvious difference: the European allies are situated along the forward line of defense. The United States can "decide" whether it wants to pitch its own security perimeter along that common line.

It may be unpleasant to inquire about the problems of NATO from an American viewpoint, and it may seem crass to weigh those problems primarily on the grounds of cost to Americans. Yet considerations of cost (underlying the political pique voiced by conservative Americans, and traded off against the risk involved in holding our nuclear umbrella over our European allies) will decide the future of NATO. And that future will be disposed within the American political, economic and social process.

Moreover, there may be little that is peculiar to NATO that argues for a change in the present dispositions. The attempt (and most are of this kind) to treat NATO as an issue in itself will probably end in exhausted and frustrated affirmation of the present stance. It is America's need to reexamine its comprehensive national strategy that may indicate a shift in its relation to Europe.

II

The alliance of Atlantic nations has been beset by many problems. There have been the periodic recrudescence of

commercial and agricultural disputes; the irreconcilable antagonism of pairs of nations, such as Greece and Turkey; the threat of Eurocommunism; the acrimony over "burden-sharing"; the complaints about the "one-way street" of American military production for the alliance; the assaults of neutralists and anti-American political groups; the failures of "consultation"; and the recriminations about American "hegemony." But, whatever else is wrong with the Atlantic alliance, its essential problems are strategic.

NATO's history, from its beginning in 1949 to the present, could be written in terms of a series of strategic crises: the failure of the EDC, the Suez and Hungarian crises, the Cuban missile confrontation, the Skybolt fiasco, the failure of the MLF, de Gaulle's withdrawal, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Kissinger's futile "Year of Europe," the October 1973 Mideast war and the response to OPEC, the divergent reactions to Afghanistan and Central America.

The recent crisis of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) deserves special comment. Although the emplacement of American missiles was a response to German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's 1977 plea for some regional balance to the Soviet SS-20s, the compromise "two-track" decision opened an abyss between the European and American allies: the United States bent on a considerable deployment of INF, the Europeans intent on negotiations with the Soviet Union. True, the cohesion of NATO has weathered five years of Soviet bluster and the excitement of West European peace groups. But the crisis illustrates a point of deeper significance. One might ask why European governments—with some reluctance in Holland and Belgium—would have wanted these longer-range nuclear weapons in the first place. The additional protection they afford is illusory; they are not even subject to European control. The new missiles are not an increment to NATO's strength; rather, they represent another European attempt to secure America's commitment to the defense of Europe. They are a symbol of Europe's abiding distrust of America's extended deterrence.

III

What does all this history prove? First, NATO's crises are not random. There is a common thread; they are all tests of confidence among the allies. Second, the crises are not accidental or superficial. They would not be crises if they did not have deep causal roots; in fact, they derive from the divergent

conceptions of alliance, the divergent security needs, and the divergent geopolitical situations of the United States and Europe. Third, the crises are not novel. They stem from problems that have been implicit in the alliance from its inception.

Thirty-six years after the founding of NATO, the defense of Western Europe still rests on the proposition that an American president will invite the destruction of our cities and the incineration of 100 million of our citizens to repel a Soviet incursion or resist a Soviet ultimatum in Western Europe. On its face, America's war plan—never denied by any president from Truman to Reagan, or by any secretary of state from George Marshall to George Shultz—is the first use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, to defend Europe. But, under the surface, America's nuclear commitment to Europe is not so sure. The word that encapsulates this problem is "coupling"—a term of art used by strategic analysts to connote the integrity of the chain of escalation, from conventional war in Europe to theater nuclear weapons to the use of America's ultimate strategic weapon.

In a larger sense, coupling connotes the identity of the fates of the peoples, societies and political systems on both sides of the Atlantic. The root of the problem is that America, the alliance guarantor, hoping to escape the destruction of nuclear war, will seek to put time between the outbreak of war in Europe and the decision to escalate to nuclear weapons, and will take whatever advantage it can of its distance from Europe. (Not that an adversary is likely to test American will with an attack on Europe. Odds of, say, 65 percent of an American nuclear response will restrain a potential aggressor. Even a whiff of American nuclear retaliation is probably enough to keep the Soviet Union from invading Western Europe. But those odds will not convince allies. There is a nagging asymmetry about nuclear protection: it takes more credibility to keep an ally than to deter an adversary.)

Virtually every American strategic move—the multilateral force, flexible response, the Schlesinger Doctrine, the neutron bomb, INF—has evoked the specter of decoupling in one or another of its forms: either the avoidance of a nuclear response altogether or the attempt to confine even a nuclear conflict to the European theater. Recently, the Strategic Defense Initiative, a design to protect American society from Soviet missiles, has stirred European concern that the United States could afford a "Fortress America" mentality and ignore forward

defense in Europe. And America's current attempt to endow NATO forces with "emerging technology" has had the significance, for some Europeans, of further detaching the United States from its commitment to escalate to nuclear weapons, specifically by promising conventional coverage of some targets that now require nuclear systems.

At issue here is not whether these American strategic moves are well planned or well meant—they might even have the declared or ostensible purpose of affirming coupling—but whether they have the possible effect of attenuating the American connection with Europe; whether they provide reasons, or pretexts, for the United States to make its escalation to strategic nuclear weapons less than prompt and automatic; whether they give the United States additional "firebreaks." Coupling is the essence of alliance protection in a nuclear age, and firebreaks are an imperative of American security. But coupling and firebreaks are inversely related.

IV

America's commitment to NATO can scarcely be evaluated without examining the logic of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence (as opposed to central, or primary, deterrence) is the attempt to discourage attacks or pressures against nations and peoples other than ourselves by threatening the use of our nuclear weapons. Some would say that NATO, more than other alliances, not only depends on, but virtually consists of, the extended deterrence provided by its principal guarantor, the United States. That is perhaps an exaggeration, but it suggests a fault-line in NATO: the requisites of extended deterrence and the difficulties in achieving those requisites result, to the extent that we succeed, in danger and expense to the United States, and yet, to the extent that we fail, in the implausibility of our protection of Europe.

What are the requisites of extended deterrence? It can be argued that to validate extended deterrence—that is, to be seen as standing ready to implement it as convincingly as we do central deterrence—requires the practical invulnerability of our own society to Soviet attack. (I say "practical," since absolute invulnerability is beyond anyone's reach; what is required is to limit damage to "tolerable" levels of casualties and destruction.) This is so an American president can persuade others that he would risk an attack on our homeland in the act

of spreading America's protective mantle over Western Europe and other parts of the world. If we were to seek societal invulnerability, we would have to work through both our defensive and our offensive strategic systems. First, we would have to achieve a strategic defense. Second, we would have to be able to hold in reserve, after any of the earlier stages of protracted nuclear exchange, enough destructive power to threaten strikes against Soviet cities. Finally, we would have to acquire the capability to limit damage to the United States by killing hard targets, such as Soviet missiles in their silos, and perhaps Soviet command bunkers, and control and communication facilities.

This latter requirement for a counterforce capability has two liabilities: it is open-ended, and it is unstable. A damage-limiting attack against hard targets is a demanding requirement, in numbers and characteristics of weapons. And, to have its intended effect, it must be preemptive. Indeed, counterforce and first nuclear strike are mutually dependent. A first strike implies counterforce targeting, since, at the strategic level, the only initial attack that makes sense is the destruction of as much of the enemy's nuclear force as possible. In return, counterforce targeting implies a first strike, because a second strike against the enemy's missiles is useless to the extent that one's missiles would hit empty holes.

This is not to argue for any of these implementing measures. Quite the contrary, it is to show how our weapons and our strategic doctrines, far from being mindless, are closely dictated by our alliance responsibilities. Conversely, our willingness to protect allies rises and falls generally with our ability to protect our own society from nuclear attack and, more specifically, with the prospective viability of counterforce. To the extent that there is any explicit doubt—technical, economic, political—that we will achieve that invulnerability or that we should pursue counterforce (and I believe there should be such doubt), there is an implicit doubt that our extensive nuclear commitments, especially to Western Europe, can survive.

As long as the United States is committed to the defense of Europe, the risks that stem from our extended deterrence will inspire attempts to avoid the contingent nuclear destruction of our homeland. Such an attempt is the case against the first use of nuclear weapons, of which the most notable statement in recent times is the 1982 article by McGeorge Bundy, George

F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith.[1] The article is classic not only in its exposition but also in the problems it incurs in its premises and argument.

Its principal problem is that it insists on maintaining the integrity of the American commitment to the defense of our West European allies; and yet it seeks to obviate the risk, to the United States, of destruction in a nuclear war. One must try to reconcile these awkward objectives. Thus, crucial to the Bundy-Kennan-McNamara-Smith proposal is that its apparent renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons is conditioned on the acquisition of an adequate conventional defense.

But those who opt for conventional defense cannot mean just any effort; they must mean high-confidence defense. And they cannot just exhort or prescribe; they have the further burden of predicting that this will be achieved. To determine the feasibility—and hence the predictive probability—of conventional defense, we must have a bill of costs. In terms of forces, I judge (from an analysis of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger's 1986 "Posture Statement," presented to Congress on February 4, 1985) that, for fiscal year 1986, the Reagan Administration intends the following regional attribution of our total of 21 active ground divisions: NATO/Europe, eleven and two-thirds divisions; east Asia, three and two-thirds divisions; other regions and the strategic reserve, five and two-thirds divisions. By applying these fractions to the total cost of our general purposes forces, $241 billion, we can calculate the rough cost of our regional commitments. By my estimate, Europe accounts for $134 billion (Asia absorbs $42 billion, and the strategic reserve, including an expanded requirement for rapid deployment forces, mostly for Centcom—that is, the Persian Gulf and southwest Asia—takes $65 billion).[2]

Given a reasonable projection of current cost growth, over the next ten years Europe will cost the United States $2.2 trillion. The appropriate question is whether even those resources will be forthcoming, let alone the greater ones required for self-sufficient conventional defense.

[1] McGeorge Bundy, *et al.*, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1982, pp. 753–766.

[2] These costs are in terms of originally requested budget authority. One hastens also to point out that most of the costs involve support units and Pentagon overhead. A more ample explanatory section appears in Earl C. Ravenal, *Defining Defense: The 1985 Military Budget*, Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1984.

V

NATO and its critics have responded by proposing various solutions to provide sufficient conventional defense, or to adjust the American relationship to the alliance, or otherwise to meet the challenge within acceptable parameters of European and American sacrifice and exposure to risk. Though generally right-minded and full of individual points of merit, in the end they prove insufficient or contradictory, or improbable of execution.

NATO has proceeded with a long list of schemes to patch up its tactical deficiencies and repair its basic defensive stance. Energetic and often imaginative efforts have been made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, beginning in the Carter Administration. These moves fall mainly into the category of "quick fixes" in NATO's existing posture: increasing armaments and firepower, including precision-guided antitank weapons and heavier American army divisions; improving electronic warfare; bringing about greater military integration of NATO in the areas of logistics, air defense, weapons procurement, communications and headquarters, and intelligence; refining doctrine and stressing maneuver; improving mobility and readiness; fostering greater use of reserves; and correcting the maldeployment of forces along the front.

Many of these moves have been accomplished. Some are sensible, as long as the alliance exists in roughly its present form, with more or less its present mission, in an international environment similar to the present one. But some of the quick fixes are not as quick or cheap as they might seem. And some moves—such as logistics integration and weapons standardization—would reduce our autonomy of decision-making and flexibility of action in the event of hostilities.

There is also a question of sufficiency, even if all these measures were taken. Such a former advocate of a staunch conventional defense as General Maxwell Taylor has doubted NATO's capability, to the point of advocating a return to the nuclear "tripwire." Taylor cites certain factors that are inherent in NATO's situation, notably the lack of maneuver depth and the vulnerability of supply lines resulting from the French withdrawal from NATO in 1966.[3] Others have questioned the ability of the navy to resupply the army in Europe in a sustained

[3] Speech at the U.S. Army War College, June 19, 1972; reprinted in *Parameters* II, 1972.

conventional war.[4] The attrition of American convoys or individual ships would be fearsome, even if we exacted an equivalent toll on attacking Soviet naval forces, undersea and surface. In any case, few European terminal ports would survive the devastation of the first few days of a war. Alternatively, heavy reliance on pre-positioned equipment would make our entire posture vulnerable to prompt Soviet air strikes.

NATO's second response is addressed to the more advanced offensive capabilities imputed to Soviet forces in central Europe. To this end, NATO has acquired an interest in emerging technology and associated tactical concepts. Emerging technology is literally a *deus ex machina*. It consists of revolutionary developments in long-range surveillance and target acquisition, and in lethal specialized submunitions and accurate terminal guidance. The tactical concepts—sometimes generically labeled "Deep Strike"—are bold attempts to target the second-echelon Soviet armored units, logistical installations, choke points and airfields, usually far behind the forward edge of battle.

Many aspects of the new military technologies and tactical doctrines are constructive. But serious questions have arisen. Some center on the technical feasibility and high cost of the new systems. Still other critiques challenge their relevance to the specific threat, the Soviet "operational maneuver groups." These are mobile, combined-arms units of less than divisional size that range laterally, just behind the front edge of the battle, to exploit opportunities; they would be hard to interdict with the new weapons and tactics, since they operate close to the front and do not require massing.[5] Another objection is that the new munitions, though themselves conventional, use the same delivery vehicles that are assigned to nuclear weapons; this might create a fatal ambiguity in a war. And the duality of delivery vehicles might subvert arms control by complicating verification. Indeed, emerging technology itself could spur a conventional arms race in central Europe.

Other measures are periodically proposed to ease the impact

[4] On this point, see the statements of Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, and Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., chief of Naval Operations, reported in Federation of American Scientists, *F.A.S. Public Interest Report*, December 1974. See also Captain Robert H. Smith, "Toward a Navy Second to One," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, November 1972.

[5] See Steven L. Canby, "The Conventional Defense of Europe: The Operational Limits of Emerging Technology," The Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., May 29, 1984. Cited by permission of the author.

of the American commitment to defend Europe. One category involves adjusting roles and burdens within the alliance. The West European countries are spending on defense, in percentages of their gross national products, only fractions of what the United States is spending; that gap is growing larger as European governments, in periods of economic stringency, slight their contributions to defense. In one reckoning, comparative contributions of certain NATO allies are as follows: the United States, 7.3 percent; Britain, 5.3 percent; France, 3.3 percent; Netherlands, 3.2 percent; and West Germany, 2.7 percent.[6]

The reaction in the U.S. Congress to these discrepancies is reflected in an amendment proposed by Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) in the spring of 1984. Nunn, normally a strong supporter of NATO, was attempting to coerce our European allies into fulfilling their 1977 promise to increase defense spending by three percent a year. (In 1983, non-U.S. alliance members, including Canada, increased defense spending by between 1.2 and 1.7 percent, while the United States had increased its NATO spending by 4.9 to 9 percent annually over the previous four years.)[7] Nunn proposed that U.S. troop levels in Europe be cut by 90,000 (about one-third) by 1990, unless the Europeans either increased real defense spending growth to three percent or met specified logistical and force goals. The amendment was opposed by the Reagan Administration and defeated in the Senate, 55 to 41.

Yet those who support the present dispositions argue that Europe is paying the lion's share of the common costs: ". . . of the ready forces currently available in Europe, about 91 percent of the ground forces and 86 percent of the air forces come from European countries, as do 75 percent of NATO's tanks and more than 90 percent of its armored divisions."[8]

But comparing burdens is not the point, or the problem. The question has always been whether the United States is getting its own money's worth out of its forward strategy, and would still be getting its money's worth even after some putative redistribution of burdens. Inevitably, we are thrown back

[6] These figures are derived from *The Military Balance, 1984–1985*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984. Figures are generally from 1983, a few from 1982. For some reason, they appear to overstate the United States slightly and to understate West Germany, and perhaps France, somewhat.

[7] Described in Helen Dewar, "Reagan Fights Nunn Bid to Cut Troops in Europe," *The Washington Post*, June 20, 1984.

[8] Stanley R. Sloan, *Defense Burden Sharing: U.S. Relations with NATO Allies and Japan*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 8, 1983.

on the economy of alliance. There are several ways of formulating this issue. It may be that the actual costs of our preparations to support the alliance exceed our gains, even if we include as gains the benefits we derive from the contributions of allies. It may also be that, in the calculus of a possible war, the losses we would sustain through not defending forward in Europe would be less than the losses we would incur through such a defense, even if it were successful. The value of both of these outcomes must be cut by their fractional probability, which is far less than certainty, and to the latter we must add the real costs we would have sustained in preparing to defend in that way. If we are assessing bargains, it is these more comprehensive and more complex calculations that are the appropriate ones.

A more far-reaching approach to mitigating America's burdens in NATO has been labeled "devolution." It comprises a deliberate, orderly and militarily adequate effort by the United States to confer defensive capability and responsibility upon Western Europe. More than the other remedies, devolution is premised on European unity; there would have to be a fit political and strategic receptacle for the increased security capabilities and responsibilities. But the integration of the European states has not been impressive. And there is the more challenging question of combined military competence, particularly in nuclear arms. True nuclear allies must share strategies, decision-making and targeting. Even if it could be achieved, an independent European nuclear force would be at best useless to the United States, and at worst a considerable embarrassment.

The question here is not whether the West European nations could defend themselves, in some measure. It is whether the United States would benefit from continuing to be a party to such an alliance. The trouble with devolution is that, for the United States, it combines aspects of commitment and decommitment, arraying them in a series of contradictions: we would have participation without authority, risk without control, involvement without the clear ability to defend and exposure without adequate deterrence.

Another approach is the unilateral withdrawal of part of the American forces in Europe. The salient version was the Mansfield Amendment, or Resolution, offered annually in the Congress for eight years, until 1975. In its various forms, it would have reduced American troops in Europe by as much as two-

thirds, redeploying them to the United States but not (in all but one year's version) deleting them from the active force structure. Yet withdrawal of units saves nothing unless they are also deactivated.[9] Nor would the Mansfield proposal have touched the forces kept in the United States for European contingencies. Most significantly, our commitment to European defense would have remained in full force. This is not a virtue but a flaw; the Mansfield type of initiative represents withdrawal without decommitment, a precarious stance.

VI

The foregoing ideas for remedying or mitigating America's situation in Europe have some value and are often ingenious. But they do not, severally or in the aggregate, constitute a policy that would close the gap between conventional requirements and available resources, or obviate nuclear strategies that are precarious and still lack credibility.

A thorough and consistent disengagement from Europe would shed the responsibilities as well as the burdens of alliance. I believe the United States should devolve defensive tasks upon the European states, but not insist on the orderly and sufficient substitution of capabilities or harbor illusions of maintaining American political weight in subsequent European decision-making. Withdrawal from Europe would probably take a decade of preparation, diplomacy and logistical rearrangement. We would progressively reduce Europe's strategic dependence on us, and insulate ourselves from the consequences of conflict in Europe.

It is important to reiterate and emphasize that disengagement from the defense of Europe would make sense (or not) only as part of a broad alternative conception of foreign policy and national strategy for the United States. The resolution of our defense predicament and our fiscal dilemma suggests a wholesale remedy. Globally, we would draw back to a line that has two mutually reinforcing characteristics: credibility and feasibility; a line that we *must* hold, as part of the definition of our sovereignty, and that we *can* hold, as a defensive perimeter and a strategic force concept that can be maintained with advantage and within constraints over the long haul.

[9] Morton H. Halperin, "Keeping Our Troops in Europe," *The New York Times Magazine*, October 17, 1982.

If we were to disengage, we could save on the order of $150 billion a year from the current defense budgets. (Another $80–$100 billion or more, to close the federal budgetary gap that looms each year for the rest of this decade at least, should come from stringent cuts in entitlements and other domestic programs.) We could defend our essential security and our central values with a much smaller force structure than we now have. Such a force structure would provide the following general purpose forces: eight land divisions (six army and two marine), 20 tactical air-wing equivalents (11 air force, four marine and five navy), and six carrier battle groups. With the addition of a diad of nuclear forces—submarines and cruise-missile-armed bombers—this would mean manpower of 1,185,000 men (army 370,000, air force 315,000, navy 365,000, marine corps 135,000). The total defense budget at the end of a decade of adjustment would be about $158 billion in 1986 dollars. In contrast, the Reagan Administration has requested, for 1986, 21 land divisions and 44 tactical air-wing equivalents, with 13 carrier battle groups; this force requires 2,178,000 men and $314 billion.

Unless we change our course, the defense budget will be close to $750 billion by 1995, and cumulative defense spending during that decade will be over $5.1 trillion. Under a noninterventionist policy, the 1995 defense budget would be two-thirds less, and the cumulative cost over ten years would be under $2.7 trillion. The savings from our present European spending would amount to a greater fraction than the savings from the overall defense budget, since Atlantic-oriented forces would constitute only 26 percent of the non-interventionist program, compared to the current European-oriented forces that constitute 42.5 percent of the present defense program. At the end of a decade of adjustment, there would be no American forces in Europe; but in and around the United States, oriented toward the Atlantic, there would be three (army) divisions, seven tactical air-wing equivalents (five air force and two navy), and three carrier battle groups. Cumulatively, over ten years, instead of spending $2.2 trillion on NATO, we would have spent only $900 billion in that direction.

If we are to cut defense spending significantly, we must change our national strategy and our foreign policy. The only way to save significant sums from the defense budget is to remove large, noticeable units from the force structure. And this would make it necessary, somewhere along the line, to

reduce our defensive commitments in the world. Specifically, both of the cardinal elements of the present American national strategy would have to change. Instead of deterrence and alliance, we would pursue war-avoidance and self-reliance. Self-reliance is a response to (as well as a precipitant of) the dissolution of alliances, nuclear proliferation and the practical demise of extended deterrence. Precisely because America's stance in the world is essentially defensive, rather than aggressive and expansive, we would benefit from a compartmentalization of deadly quarrels between other nations. Compartmentalization must mean the delegation of defensive tasks to regional countries and the acceptance of the results of this, win or lose. We would, over time, accommodate the dissolution of defensive commitments that obligate us to overseas intervention—not just in Europe, but in the western Pacific and the Middle East.

The other phase of this alternative national strategy, war-avoidance, is a response to the diffusion of power, the attainment of nuclear parity by the Soviet Union, and the risk of nuclear destruction to ourselves. It is based on the fact that we can no longer intricately and reliably manipulate or manage conflict. We will always need a strategy that discourages direct nuclear attacks on our homeland or intolerable coercion of our national political choices through nuclear threats. But today our own safety depends on maintaining "crisis stability," where both sides have a strong incentive to avoid striking first with their nuclear weapons. A design for stability must include, among other elements, an unconditional doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons. And a consistent policy of no first use implies the dissolution of our defensive commitment to NATO.

VII

Because I propose a more restrained national strategy, with smaller forces and defense budgets, that does not mean that I take the "threat" as trivial or nonexistent. On the contrary, the essence of a true noninterventionist position, both historically and logically, is that it takes threats seriously but is prepared to accept some foreign damage, for fundamental reasons that have to do with preserving the integrity of our political, social and economic system from the kinds of distorted effort and misguided control that proceed from far-reaching responses to external challenge.

There are other kinds of answers to the doubts about Amer-

ican disengagement. The alleged unfavorable consequences that we should examine are the ultimate effects on the core of basic American values: the integrity of our constitutional system, the safety of our lives and domestic property, the health of our economy and the quality of our lives. (This definition does not include the indefinite defense of relatively congenial political systems abroad.) The possibility that we would have to confront a final threat to these basic values is remote. Surely it is not the contingent certainty (1.0 probability) conjured up by those who fear any departure from the status quo.

Still another kind of answer to the doubts that follow upon American disengagement would be the demonstration that Europe by itself does indeed have a strong basis for self-defense and therefore could achieve a good probability of deterrence. A seeming contradiction here is really a simple irony: as long as the United States remains the alliance guarantor, it must contribute substantial conventional forces, as well as provide continuous coupling of our nuclear forces for extended deterrence. These specifically American contributions are necessary to satisfy the requisites of alliance, not absolutely necessary to ward off a Soviet attack or pressures.

In the event of an American withdrawal, the most obvious, though least likely, scenario is a calculated large-scale Soviet invasion of Western Europe. A more plausible challenge is that American withdrawal would lay Western Europe open to Soviet pressures and, because of Europe's sense of impotence and exposure, the outcome would be "Finlandization." True, Finlandization and more intensive establishment of satellites have occurred in cases marked by special circumstances. The real question is: would the model apply to a large, populous, rich, industrially capable, socially whole, politically resolute country with a military force that would have far more than nuisance value—a country, in short, such as West Germany? It is hardly likely. Finlandization requires a willing victim as well as a determined aggressor.

But, if Finlandization is excluded, what would America's European allies do in the event of our disengagement? Their options range from acquiring national nuclear forces, to improving their conventional defenses, forging a new European military community, adopting unconventional defensive strategies (often suggested are forms of territorial defense or mobilization on the Swedish, Yugoslavian, Swiss or Israeli models, or even less orthodox strategies of denial or attrition), or doing

all, or several, or none of the above. Each nation, according to its external and internal situation, would adopt some combination of moves. It is far from certain that West Germany would independently go nuclear; that would worsen its position not only with the Soviet Union but also with its West European partners.

Were Western Europe to coalesce, it could become the second most powerful entity in the world—in theory more powerful than the Soviet Union. Even now, Western Europe has greater population (372 million), more ample economic potential ($2.6 trillion in gross national product), comparable military manpower (over 3.1 million), a respectably competitive military technology, and the calculable nuclear forces of Britain and France. NATO Europe's aggregate defense spending, however, is markedly inferior ($83 billion).

Indeed, the proposals of military analysts for quick fixes, though designed to improve NATO so that it would be bearable for the United States to remain, ironically hold possibilities for Western Europe without the United States. If NATO's weaknesses are just beginning to be addressed (the alliance has been maldeployed, stretched thin, immobile, wrongly configured, badly integrated) and, further, if the Soviet Union could have achieved its present military advantage from an inferior production and manpower base and from a weaker economic and social system, then it is not fanciful to imagine that the West European countries—together, or even powerful ones such as West Germany individually—could generate a formidable defense.

Finally, when the question of American disengagement is broached, an automatic rejoinder is that shared values—cultural, political, social, economic—form both the basis of our attachment and the ultimate justification for our continued defensive support. Indeed, it is argued (in an exercise of circular reasoning) that our support itself is a value, a moral worth that transcends any calculus of net utility. But no argument about values is whole, or even clear, unless it is stated from the vantage point of some subject. Whether right or wrong, my argument is a view from the United States. Americans are faced with an increasingly demarcated choice: the salvation of Europe, or their own solvency and safety.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

Our third witness is Ms. Catherine McArdle Kelleher. She is professor and head of the National Security Studies Program at the University of Maryland.

She received a Ph.D. from MIT in 1967, and has taught at the National War College and, the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver. She has served in the National Security Council, and has been a fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

Ms. Kelleher is the recipient of research grants and fellowships from the Social Science Research Council, the Council on Foreign Relations, the German Marshall Fund, the NATO Research Fellow Program, the Ford Foundation and the National War College.

We welcome Ms. Kelleher.

STATEMENT OF CATHERINE McARDLE KELLEHER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

Ms. KELLEHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to speak this morning, if I may, on the bases of some of the studies done with the support you have just enumerated, and, specifically, a project that I have carried out over the last 5 years comparing United States and European attitudes on questions of wealth, welfare, and security, a study carried out with two coauthors.

Senator PRESSLER. A study carried out with whom?

Ms. KELLEHER. With two coauthors.

Senator PRESSLER. Would you move the microphone a little further away from you?

Ms. KELLEHER. Fine. There were two coauthors, Richard Eichenberg of Tufts University, and William Domkey of the University of California at Davis.

This study dealt with public opinion trends for the last 20 years in Western Europe and with a series of structured, comparable interviews held in four European countries—Germany, France, Holland, and Britain—as well as in the United States during the years 1981 and 1984.

In coming to the question that has been posed by the committee, perhaps the simplest answers out of our study would be yes to both sides of the question. Specifically, our findings and those carried out I think by a number of associated European scholars suggest that support for NATO and particularly the image of the alliance itself, while it has been subject to great stress in the last 6 years has, in fact, emerged with remarkable inviolability, given these kinds of strains.

In a sense, speaking only from the American perspective, the results from our interviews, particularly with American elites, suggest that while NATO is the focus of much continuing irritation—that referred to by Dr. Ravenal—it is, in fact, an accepted given, as the framework with which the United States manages a wide range of economic and political relationships as well as military relationships with its principal allies.

In this sense, it carries on the tradition which, in fact, were the base conditions for the foundation of the alliance itself, mainly, the strategy enunciated by George Kennan and the "Fathers of Containment" in the late 1940's, that what was needed was a framework in which to manage the favorable economic and political order which would develop on the European mainland.

It is also a framework in an area in which the United States is in direct confrontation with the Soviet Union—not in a period of hot war, but certainly in a continuing situation of "hot peace." This framework, indeed, provides a way in which to manage not only the day-to-day irritations but, in fact, some of the larger questions of the adaptation to changes in power structure which have occurred over the postwar period.

In this sense, our findings, at least, suggest great care with the interpretation of findings taken at a point of high mutual irritation, specifically 1983. In this case, the kinds of evidence that John Rielly presented and that have been presented by the Atlantic Council studies suggest that at this highpoint of the INF study, just before the so-called hot fall of 1983, there was, indeed, major questioning and uncertainty and perhaps even a failure of political leadership in many of the West European allied states.

There is, however, if one looks at the trend in opinion since that time, specifically the Gallup polls which are taken in all major European countries since really 1960, on a monthly basis, one would find a considerable falloff from the kinds of trends that could be reported out of either 1981, our first interview point, or from 1983.

In fact, what is amazing is not just the continuing overwhelming support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as symbol, symbol that I would say from my own other research has attracted tremendous support in broad generational categories throughout populations, but that, indeed, it is looked upon as a given, as an accepted framework for both future action as well as present commitment.

In this sense, one is driven, however, to ask if the impact of the symbol, in terms of the specific set of actions taken both by governments and by opposition political parties in their attempts to become governments, that is, as to what will be the European contribution.

Here, I think, despite an economic recession which in many ways had much deeper effects in Europe than has been the case in the United States, one finds really relative consistency in the type of contributions proposed and, indeed, those actually carried out by national governments.

Opposition parties, with, perhaps, the exception of Great Britain, and there only in the case of one opposition party, have, in fact, called for more or less the continuation of the steady level of defense expenditures, indeed even increases which, while not up to the standard set in the decisions of 1977, still represent increases at a time in which other budget categories are, indeed, sustaining major cuts.

THE AGENDA OF THE NATO ALLIANCE: A SUBJECT OF GREAT CONCERN

What our findings suggested, however, is that, as always, the agenda of the alliance, in terms of the management of particular trends and particular sources of interpretation, turns out to be a subject of great concern. Here, perhaps going beyond the traditional questions of extended deterrence discussed by my fellow panelists this morning, I would like to point out three that seem, from our research, to be of particular concern.

The first is the relationship—perhaps one should say the interrelationship—between military efforts and the economic interpretations of security. Most usually discussed in these United States as easy tradeoffs between guns and butter, we found in our American and European studies that the questions are far more complex. It is really a question of the way in which the necessary adaptation of advanced industrial societies will make the kinds of challenges posed not only by high-technology investment but changes in employment and, indeed, in the structure of the industrial base itself.

In this case, as we have recently seen in the case of SDI, it may well be that security itself is viewed in purely economic impact terms as far as the domestic economy is concerned.

Indeed, I think in the last several months, one has seen an interpretation of European support for SDI, more in terms of the fear that without that involvement, whatever the merit of the idea from a defensive point of view, European industries would continue to be at a marked disadvantage vis-a-vis those in the United States, particularly in the high-technology area.

One needs not to go back over the rather dreary history of the two-way street initiative, certainly in the Carter administration and stretching well back to the first report of the "wise men of NATO" of 1956, which urged greater European and American coproduction of weapons. But here, too, the question is how indeed can we manage on a transatlantic basis the adaptation to changing economic patterns and, in fact, cushion the impact of structural changes in economies on both sides of the Atlantic to mutual rather than competitive advantage.

Second, and here one moves perhaps through changing political generations in a real sense, not once but really which reflect some sort of march destined of every 20-year age group through different sets of policies, here I think we are talking about the impact of generations which are no longer as well acquainted with one another as was the case in the immediate postwar era, even the decades through the 1960's.

Political irritation, particularly of the kind that necessarily breaks out in close relationships, is particularly hard when individuals do not have a history, a political history of working together and, in fact, of having faced political irritations in the past and to be cheered by at least the memory of overcoming, if not necessarily resolving, these irritations together.

WHAT CAN BOLSTER THE ALLIANCE?

In this case, the Europeans, at least that we talked with, put a considerable emphasis on what they saw as a tendency toward further on-the-job training for American political leaders in issues of

the alliance, and, indeed, even in the history of decisions taken and difficulties overcome in the past.

On a much less immediately important level, there has been a major decline in the numbers of students and, in fact, of young political leaders who are exchanged on a regular basis. It is no longer part of the political education of young political party members, those destined for rising stardom, to, in fact, come to the United States for an extended period of study, ones in which they would form contacts which would continue throughout their political life. The same, while not as true for American political leaders in the immediate postwar period, is even less true now of those entering not just the Congress itself but, indeed, all levels of political activity.

Last, but not least, is the question within the alliance itself of a set of structures which allow a joint search for alternatives to new and changing political-military conditions.

Here, I think one could point to several different suggestions which have come forward from research institutes and political parties about possible ways in which the alliance jointly would manage what would be a significant structural problem in terms of manpower, namely, the changing demographic trends, particularly in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1990's. Where, simply because of a change in the size of the age cohort, one is talking about either having smaller ready forces or, indeed, providing different kinds of structures in which military capability can be maintained.

This is a problem which is well known to those who have looked at the figures. It is not possible to grow instant soldiers between now and 1992, short of taking some rather different steps in terms of the patterns so far politically sanctions as to who will serve and how they will be paid.

But it does seem that, at least within the alliance framework so far, that the question of managing this necessary demographic dip has not yet reached a point of political coordination or one in which there is great political incentive being shown toward solving the problem in common, rather than individually on acceptable national bases.

A second structural question, one on which greater success has been achieved in the last 2 or 3 years, is the repeated interest not only of the military leadership and the political leadership, but I think in electorates on both sides of the Atlantic the question of the substitution of conventional weapons, particularly new technologies available now and in the foreseeable future for tasks and missions formerly assigned to military uses of nuclear power.

Under the *Montebello* decision in 1983, the alliance itself is pledged to reduce the number of nuclear warheads within the alliance to a level, I believe, of 4,500. This reflects a very definite commitment to exploration of the use of conventional technologies in particular kinds of missions, not only those related to the battlefield but, indeed, to longer range missions now assigned tactical nuclear weapons.

The effort in terms of studies, in terms of cooperation among relevant military authorities is well advanced. The degree to which this has been explained to broader levels of leadership, particularly

the political leadership on both sides of the Atlantic, in terms not only of the new risks but also the new costs that will be involved, is, it seems, something which is again left to limited national efforts suited to national political agendas and with very little attempt to show a common effort toward solution.

Perhaps in the last of my structural dilemmas to be enumerated would be a question of the management of what seems to be, particularly in terms of the Federal Republic of Germany, a particular problem which will, in fact, increase in the foreseeable future, and that is the urge, within the Federal Republic of Germany, and, seemingly, to some extent, within the German Democratic Republic, to continue a dialog about at least common pasts if not common futures.

The urge toward reunification I think is one which is very far down any German political leader's now conceivable agenda for the future. But, clearly in terms of the developments of the last 10 years, there is, as most Germans would mention to you very quickly, the human side of détente, the human side of relationships.

The question of the priority of this set of concerns vis-a-vis the commitment to the alliance is one which I think is very much exaggerated. I can think of no conceivable electable political leadership in the Federal Republic of Germany that would even raise the question of possible tradeoff.

But it is something which remains, this many years after the end of World War II, a continuing problem on the German political agenda.

It is a relationship which has already been handled in structural terms by not, perhaps, talking about it very much within the European Economic Community, which recognizes this particular relationship on the part of the Federal Republic. It is, however, within at least some popular appreciations of NATO affairs still a question which raises issues about the reliability of the German commitment to NATO itself.

Seemingly again within small circles of political leaders and those who are given formal responsibility for NATO affairs, this is a question which has already received some attention. But its recognition is something not incompatible with the present NATO framework, is something which, again, would benefit from some joint attention and, in fact, some political education, if not leadership.

Thank you very much.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much. All three of you gave excellent testimony.

I want to begin by asking Mr. Rielly several questions about his poll, particularly regarding his polling data and the conduct of the survey. You know, in politics we are always quite correctly criticized regarding our polls, because you can make a poll say almost anything.

I'd like to play the devil's advocate for a moment. I noted in your statement that 90 percent of our leaders would support Germany if it were invaded by Russian troops, but a much smaller percentage would support United States troop involvement if El Salvador were about to be taken over by guerrillas. You are comparing "apples" and "oranges" in the sense that if we had said El Salvador was

about to be invaded by Cuban or Russian troops, there would be more of an analogous question.

I am not saying that there was anything wrong with the survey. However, you could argue your data in a number of ways. You could ask how many people would support sending United States troops into Germany if they were about to be taken over by leftist guerrillas, which is not a likely possibility. So, it is hard to have a direct comparison.

Wouldn't you agree that the case of one country being invaded by Russian troops and that of another in danger of being taken over by internal guerrillas are quite different? In the one case, wouldn't an individual's reaction be naturally less supportive of sending troops?

Mr. RIELLY. Mr. Chairman, I would agree. There would be some difference.

However, we asked that question in several different ways, not only in the way that I mentioned there, although it was not asked as "what would be your reaction if Soviet troops invaded El Salvador?"

The various ways we did put it suggested a very great difference in perception and priority given to Central America versus Europe. There is no question that the precise way in which you formulate questions makes a big difference.

We found in studying some of the work done on the INF question in Europe, and especially in Germany, that there were tremendous differences in result, according to the way the question was formulated, which suggests that your point is well taken overall.

Senator PRESSLER. I will address this question to both of you. How are these surveys done? How large is the sampling and how do you conduct the surveys that have been referred to here today.

Mr. RIELLY. Let me mention that I have relied primarily on our own study for conclusions about the United States.

We do a study every 4 years of both the American public and the leadership. The public samples are of what the pollsters call a full field sample of 1,540. The actual polling is done by the Gallup organization, and, of course, that sample is broken down by geography, age, religion, gender, race, and is truly a representative sample of the American people.

Our leadership survey is 341 leaders, drawn from leaders both of governmental institutions, both of executive branch and legislative, from private organizations that are involved in some way in international affairs, whether it be business, finance, labor unions, religious leaders, social groups, universities, meeting institutions. The leaders who are interviewed, in this case both primarily in person, are not necessarily representative in the same sense that the popular sample is. This is to say you would not have the same distribution by age or geography.

There is no question that because they are leaders of major national organizations, whether commercial, nonprofit, or governmental, there is a certain skewing there.

Anyway, that is how we do it.

In the studies that I have cited on the European side, a variety of studies, I have relied heavily on the series of studies which the Atlantic Institute has done in the last 5 years in European countries

and also on a number of studies done by the Allensbach Institute in Germany as well as Politbarometer.

Ms. KELLEHER. The studies that we used are really of several different varieties.

One was a panel study, as it's called, in the five countries of 35 people who were interviewed at two different points in time. To get 35, we had to, in fact, draw up a list of about 75. This we did in collaboration with the various European institutes which are comparable to the Council on Foreign Relations, but with care to include opposition politicians as well as the more usual categories of leaders.

In terms of the public opinion surveys, we have relied heavily on the Gallup and monthly survey that is done, with a sample in each country of 1,100 people every month, and stratified in much the same sort of way. The good value of that particular survey is the same question is asked over and over again in each country, so one really does have a temperature taking at various times, that one can look at the same question and the responses, say, in June, 1983, and then again, say, in December, 1984, to gauge the kinds of effects.

In addition, we inserted several questions in each country in a national poll that was done five times during each of the years in which we interviewed, to have a measure of the difference between what we were picking up in interviews and what would be asked and answered in that particular country.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, I was going to suggest that Mr. Rielly does not have a copy of the Chicago poll with him, and, therefore, that he might send one to the committee because it is one that I am familiar with and it is extraordinarily useful because of the breadth of the issues that it raises. And they do publish it, so it is widely available.

I think all of these polls, all of these results would be of interest to the committee. That happens to be the one that I am more familiar with, and I would think that we should make it regular reading. I would hope that we could have access to all of them.

[The information referred to follows:]

American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1983, published by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Ravenal, the thrust of your testimony seemed to be that the United States and Western Europe are actually decoupled already; they just don't seem to know it, if I understand you correctly.

Your basic reason for the decoupling seems to be the doubt expressed by Charles deGaulle and others that when push comes to shove, an American president would never employ U.S. strategic weapons to defend, Europe due to a fear of Soviet retaliation to the United States homeland.

Indeed, I was in France with Senator Dole in April. We had a meeting with the Foreign Minister, who said somewhat the same thing. He really defended the French independent nuclear capability.

Isn't the essence of "coupling" the creation of circumstances that automatically involve the United States in the event of Soviet aggression against Western Europe? And, have we not, in fact, created such circumstances by deploying 300,000 American troops in Europe, along with tactical and intermediate range nuclear weapons. Isn't it time that the Soviets must expect that these weapons would be launched if they invaded? Your contention is that we are inherently decoupled. Is that correct? Haven't we generated the uncertainty necessary to temper Soviet aggression?

Mr. RAVENAL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to beg your indulgence because of a hearing problem and have that restated. I know this is time consuming and it is a long question.

Senator PRESSLER. That's all right.

Basically, the basis of your testimony seemed to be that we are actually decoupled from Western Europe already. You argue that the basic reason for that seems to be the French contention that the United States probably would not defend Europe if push came to shove, because of a fear of Soviet retaliation.

The essence of coupling, if we can use that word, between the United States and NATO, is the creation of circumstances that would automatically involve the United States in the event of Soviet aggression against Western Europe. Please address that whole question, that whole area.

Mr. RAVENAL. That is the irony of the whole relationship of coupling and why the United States in a crisis might actually sever those links, and why, projectively looking at some future crisis in NATO, we have to draw the conclusion, a very skeptical conclusion, a conclusion that Europeans are increasingly drawing, that the United States already is effectively decoupled because an American President will continue in a crisis to put time and distance between the inevitability of American escalation to nuclear weapons and the situation at hand.

I see this as an objective impairment in the American strategic nuclear guarantee, that is, extended deterrence.

This is an objective fact. It is not something that depends upon the response to a present surface question, would you commit the United States totally to the defense of Europe in the event of a Soviet attack? The answer is, invariably, yes. Of course you are going to get 97 percent of American elites to answer yes to a question like that. But if you examine the structure of entailment, what is involved, what the United States must do in order to implement its commitment to the defense of Western Europe and then take that question apart and project, predict what the American response might be and those precise contingencies that would be evoked if NATO were ever attacked, that is when you begin to get a few rays of light into the situation.

If it were not the case that Europeans already widely distrust the automaticity of an American nuclear response under those circumstances, then you would not already have gotten the course of action of France over the last 20 years.

Senator MATHIAS. What was it Henry Kissinger said on this subject?

Mr. RAVENAL. I beg your pardon?

Senator MATHIAS. What was it Henry Kissinger said on this subject?

Mr. RAVENAL. Well, he made a long statement which I hesitate to repeat here verbatim, simply because of constraints of time.

But, in 1979, in Brussels, he warned Europeans—and, of course, Kissinger has been constantly, for 25 years, skeptical of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe—he warned Europeans at that conference not to continue to pester the United States for continual assurances of the integrity of our nuclear response, that is, the integrity of our extended deterrence; because under the present circumstances of nuclear parity with the Soviets and the plentitude of the nuclear weapons at the disposal of both sides, it would be not only unthinkable but it would be extremely inadvisable, as Kissinger put it, to rely on a defense that would imperil the continuance of civilization.

I obviously am putting myself in this analysis in the same camp as Kissinger, although I think it is fair to observe that Kissinger's analysis of the problem was much better than any solution that he has or has not been able to come up with.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, he also has said that there is no law that requires that every problem should have a solution.

Mr. RAVENAL. NATO might be a problem without any obvious, certainly without a congenial, solution. Therefore, even Europeans who are skeptical of the American response and critical of American policy continue, when polled or when sounded, to adhere to the preference to continue the alliance, because they have no place to go.

But this does not mean that the state of the alliance is healthy simply because you can still command, even among Europeans, a majority expression in favor of a continuance of the alliance.

Mr. RIELLY. Mr. Chairman, if I may just comment, I think it was my colleague, Earl Ravenal, who commented in another setting that one of the ironies of the current situation is that you need a higher degree of credibility for allies than you do for adversaries. I think that is one of the problems.

Senator PRESSLER. Our topic today is the "crisis of will" in NATO. There have been a number of crises in NATO since it was founded. We have seen the Suez crisis, the Skybolt debate, the expulsion of NATO from Paris and the withdrawal of France from the integrated command structure, among others.

Given these crises, do we truly have a "crisis of will?" Is there something structurally obsolete in NATO; does it need to be changed?

I also have a second question on a subject that we have not touched on the soft underbelly of NATO, the Greek-Turkish conflict in the Aegean that has been called NATO's weakest link. Do you believe that NATO's southern flank is adequately protected?

Does anybody want to tackle any part of those questions?

Ms. KELLEHER. Let me perhaps start by saying that I don't think that the description "crisis of will" adequately describes or, in fact, is somewhat more dramatic than the situation deserves at the moment.

I think what we have is, to adopt some of Earl Ravenal's description, is a continuing situation in which crisis is predictable and in

which the damage-limiting efforts in any particular crisis can be quite successful.

I think, coming out of the INF crisis, we have done rather better than I, at least, thought we were going to in terms of the political support among broad masses of Europeans.

I think that you see this in present reactions, despite the best efforts of what remains, what little remains of the organized peace campaigns, to interest their audience in opposition to SDI.

Senator PRESSLER. Repeat that please.

Ms. KELLEHER. To interest their former constituents in SDI, in opposition to SDI. One hears mostly apathy, and this despite some serious efforts in both Germany and Britain to suggest that this is not only the same kind of crisis as INF, but, indeed, one with greater and more severe implications for alliance structure generally.

I think, however, that one should also be careful, perhaps to pick up pieces of your bundle, in differentiating between parts of NATO which are doing rather better than others, and here, perhaps in terms of Mr. Ravenal's comments on the nuclear side, I think that we would be overlooking a good part of the good news if one did not look at the substantial increase in conventional capabilities that has, indeed, occurred on the central front.

One can well draw from a number of different circles of experts very different interpretations of what has been happening on the Soviet side. But I think there is no one who would not argue that, in terms of capability on the ground, particularly conventional as opposed to tactical nuclear, that there has been a major increase over the last decade, both in quantity and certainly in quality of forces there, as well as in those things which General Rogers talks about regularly, readiness and sustainability. It is not what we would wish. But it is a great deal better than we have done in the past, and I think it should be recognized.

I think the situation on the flanks is, in fact, rather different. The northern flank continues to have a set of problems. But there, too, there have been increases, at least in terms of the standing forces and the ability to move them quickly to, in fact, contain points of trouble.

In the southern flank there are very real political, as well as military, problems, not just between Greece and Turkey but, indeed, the whole question of the integration of Spain into a southern flank framework, so that one really has a far greater geographic expanse as well as one marked by rather different political approaches to the question of alliance commitment.

Senator PRESSLER. Does anybody else want to respond regarding the southern flank of NATO? Does it sap the will of NATO?

Senator MATHIAS. I would prefer the chairman's description of it as the southern flank. NATO does not have a soft underbelly.

Mr. RAVENAL. You are referring to the defection, practically speaking, of Greece and the weakening of the southern flank because of the continuing altercation and the diversion of defense resources by Greece, particularly against Turkey, and to some extent by Turkey, I suppose, as well?

Senator PRESSLER. Yes.

Mr. RAVENAL. Well, yes. I think this is one of the nagging problems that has beset NATO. I don't happen to think that this is the

main ring. This is not the principal impediment to the continuance of American support for NATO. But it is a nagging problem that tends to drain away the efficiency of the resources that we commit, insofar as a portion of those resources are committed to the Mediterranean. In the future, it may make it not just politically embarrassing, but logistically very expensive and very tenuous for the United States to operate effectively with its naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. RIELLY. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any specific comment on the southern flank, but I would address just a final word to the first part of your question, about the crisis of will.

I would join Catherine Kelleher in her conclusion that the situation today represents not so much a crisis of will as reflects a change in the real situation that exists today, in 1985, from 20 or 30 years ago.

As I pointed out in my earlier remarks, from a European perspective, the fact that the Soviet Union is only an external threat today—there is no internal Communist threat that brings the two together and makes the menace larger—is a very, very important change.

A second change in the situation is that the balance of power between the United States and Europe has changed so much in the last 30 years, and we no longer have that overwhelming superiority that we had for a long time.

There is an anomaly in this situation which, as Earl Ravenal pointed out, is 40 years after the war, Europe is still reliant on an external power for its security. That is particularly anomalous in the case of Europe because for the previous 450 years Europe kind of dominate the known world, and suddenly it had, after 1945, to rely on an external power for that most elementary element of sovereignty; namely, the ability to defend its own territory.

That is, indeed, a very ironical and anomalous situation for Europe to find itself in 40 years after World War II.

Nevertheless, despite this changed situation and despite this anomaly, I think that the data introduced today by both Catherine Kelleher and me suggests that on both sides of the Atlantic, despite all of these problems and qualifications, there remains sufficient will, both to commit the resources and to take the risks of continuing this NATO alliance.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you. I have one final question for Dr. Kelleher. I note that you are the head of the National Security Studies Program at the University of Maryland. I wonder if you can give us a short description of the status of strategic studies in American universities today. I think that in the 1960's, because of the Vietnam war and related issues, a number of the strategic studies programs fell apart. At the very least, universities deemphasized them on the undergraduate level. Now, however, there is a great interest on the part of our students in terms of strategic studies.

What undergraduate courses are available, for example, at the University of Maryland? Can you give me a quick nationwide survey? I am told that courses on strategic studies and national security studies are coming back into vogue. I am sure that they are in your undergraduate classrooms, and also at the graduate level.

Please discuss the undergraduate level first, then the graduate level.

Ms. KELLEHER. Well, certainly at the undergraduate level, there has been quite an upsurge in interest. To speak specifically about the case at Maryland, we were fortunate enough through the Department of Education to get a grant which has allowed us to do a 2-year program, just beginning this fall, which has already attracted a large and really widespread enrollment for a course that its instructors call Bombs and Bullets. But it is really an attempt by both scientists and social scientists to present a variety of views on questions of international security and, specifically, on questions on the use of nuclear weapons, their impacts and alternative ways of looking at problems of security.

I think this is a trend, at least the evidence that I have seen suggests that this is true throughout the country.

I would say at the moment there are approximately 160 institutions that have courses, perhaps only for one term—ours is much more extensive—which, in fact, cover these materials, something that has not been true I would say for the last 15 years.

On the graduate level, as a result of some funding initiatives, there are a number of programs that are now much stronger than they were. Ours at the University of Maryland is, in fact, designed for those who are interested in public service, so that individuals who come to careers in government or in associations related to government will have a good grounding in a 2-year course in national security issues and a variety of perspectives.

Senator PRESSLER. So, after they take the basic courses in government and political science, in their junior and senior years—they can then concentrate on security studies? What are the names of some of the courses?

Ms. KELLEHER. That is less true on the undergraduate level than it is on the graduate level. We, in fact, look at questions of both the evolution of strategic doctrine, we have a course on the management of defense decisionmaking, a course on——

Senator PRESSLER. Is this at the undergraduate level?

Ms. KELLEHER. This is at the graduate level.

Senator PRESSLER. What about at the undergraduate level?

Ms. KELLEHER. At the undergraduate level, they would take a course, for example, in the problems of international security; they would take a course on the Soviet military and foreign policy, or United States military and foreign policy; an elective seminar in arms control, its past and its future; also questions which we are trying to develop at least at the moment for the spring term include the question of the economics of defense, which would be a special seminar just for seniors.

Senator PRESSLER. When I was an undergraduate, I had a course in international relations and used the Morgenthau book. I suppose that has been forgotten by now, hasn't it?

Ms. KELLEHER. I think it has reached "classic status" at this point.

Senator PRESSLER. I would like now to turn this over to either of my colleagues.

Senator MATHIAS. I think John Rielly had a comment, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Rielly?

Mr. RIELLY. I was just going to add, Mr. Chairman, supporting Catherine Kelleher's statement, that there are other indications of a renewed interest in strategic studies and international security. We have seen that in Chicago, with the decision of the John D. and Catherine McArthur Foundation 6 months ago. The McArthur Foundation is the second largest philanthropic organization in the United States. It took a decision to adopt as one of its three priority areas that of international security and made a series of grants for $25 million, and is attempting to do the kind of thing in the next decade, in cooperation with several other foundations, that the Ford Foundation did in the 1950's and 1960's, and I think everyone at this table would agree that they are filling a very large gap that was there and are supporting precisely the kind of thing that Catherine Kelleher and her colleagues are now implementing at the University of Maryland.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kelleher is very modest is saying this is a nationwide effort. I am glad that it is. But I think the University of Maryland is particularly strong in this field and there has been extraordinary growth at the University of Maryland in the strength of the program there, of which we are very proud.

Ms. KELLEHER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator MATHIAS. I have a question.

You have described some of the problems that are before us today, and perhaps only a fool who has a plateful of problems before him would look for additional ones. But if these hearings are to be of any significant value, I think we not only have to cope with the problems that are before us but must anticipate some of the things that could happen.

There are very friendly governments in London, in Paris, and in Bonn at the moment, highly cooperative governments in London, Paris, and Bonn. Certainly this year there is very little prospect that there will be any dramatic political change in the constellation in Europe.

But if you look at the programs of the principal opposition parties in Europe, then you have to begin to think about contingencies, it seems to me. The Labor Party in Britain talks about unilateral nuclear disarmament and has pledged to remove from British soil every nuclear weapon. That would be an interesting problem for NATO. It is one thing when New Zealand enforces such a rule; but it would be a different thing if Great Britain adopted such a rule.

It is not at all clear that the Labor Party would be able to implement such a policy if it came to power because it is not a monolithic view. Dennis Healey and other leading members of the Labor Party have not been enthusiastic about that program. But, nonetheless, it would be a problem.

Across the channel, the Mitterrand Government has been extraordinarily cooperative in NATO matters, more so than Giscard, more so than Pompidou. It's a little hard to say what the opposition there would do because it is not as well coordinated as it is in, say, the Labor Party, because you have several poles of influence in the opposition of France. But it is a question.

In Germany, where there is an articulate opposition which ranges from the Greens to the more moderate Helmut Schmidt wing of the Social Democrats, clearly there would be some kind of difference—I think not only a difference between the present Kohl government, but a difference even from the former government that was organized under the leadership of Helmut Schmidt. I don't think that would be replicated by a change of party in Germany.

Now, what do you foresee as happening, and what would you foresee as the kind of steps the United States ought to take, certainly not in anticipation of its happening, because you do not want to create self-fulfilling prophesies, but with the realization that these things could happen?

Mr. RAVENAL. I think that the attitudes of European political parties and certain constituencies that you have mentioned are profoundly contradictory. Of course, this is all supported by much of John Rielly's data.

Senator MATHIAS. I did not mean to ignore Italy and other NATO countries, but Italian politics defy very many precise definitions. I just congratulate the Italians on moving forward as successfully as they do.

Mr. RAVENAL. I detect that there will be a continuation of the tendency, even out to the very fringes of the left part of the political spectrum in Europe, to want to enjoy American support, even while criticizing a succession of the implementing moves that the United States might make through its strategy and the emplacement of weapons to provide that support. You have people as far out on the left as E.P. Thompson, a leader of the antinuclear movement in Europe, a former Communist, who will declare his sympathy for the continuance of America's NATO protection and the continuance of Britain in NATO. But, on the other hand, the actions that are taken by European left-wing parties will continually obstruct and frustrate American attempts, by our own lights, to implement our guarantee of the alliance, and consequently increasingly incite the anger, the rage, of the American right wing, which now already has emerged as the principal opponent of the continuance of America's support for NATO.

So, I foresee a kind of antiphonal exchange of opinions and demonstrations and actions by these two kinds of groups, the European left and the American right, on both sides of the Atlantic, creating continual trouble for NATO, and possibly in the future being able to muster majorities or significant blocs of congressional votes to trim, to curtail, to cut American deployments of troops and appropriations for NATO.

Ms. KELLEHER. Senator, I wonder if I might make three comments.

The first would be to perhaps revisit a bit of history and specifically in the British case, the election of Harold Wilson in 1964 on a similar platform put forward by the Labor Party then in opposition. Mr. Wilson discovered when he became Prime Minister that the Polaris submarine force, which he had then promised to his electorate at least to do away with, had become a vital national element; and 6 months after assuming office he publicly revised the party program to, in fact, include support for nuclear weapons.

I suspect that parties outside of office, particularly European political parties, which are much more guided by a set of fixed ideological criteria to establish themselves as legitimate to their own particular constituents, tend to say things which, once in office, they do not carry through on.

I think a more contemporary example might even be Mitterrand's France, which certainly looks very different in office than when the United Front was, in fact, campaigning for election.

In this sense, I think the important question is really my second point, which is, quite apart from ideological purity, what is the reason for an opposition party to believe that this kind of stand is one which will attract votes. Here I think we come back to the basic point, perhaps one of only a few on which all three of us would agree, that, as a result of a combination of circumstances in the period from 1981 to 1983, the fear of war, of the imminence of war in Europe, rose significantly. It also rose in the United States. It is a combination of a number of political factors.

I would like, if I may, to point to one that we have not discussed so far this morning, and that is a degree, if one wishes to put it this bluntly, of political irresponsibility on European governments of all parties to, in fact, remain quiet about changes in strategic situations, changes even in NATO doctrine and force structure vis-a-vis their own publics.

They found it far easier not to talk about anything, and this was, if you will, a conspiracy of silence in which all parties participated and which, when the INF crisis burst onto the scene, much like the earlier neutron bomb incident, really came from information that was available in the United States but was not available in their own countries about what their governments had agreed to, which led to at least a certain lack of confidence in the openness with which information was being disseminated.

Senator MATHIAS. Confidence on the part of the public?

Ms. KELLEHER. Yes.

Mr. RIELLY. Mr. Chairman, I share Catherine Kelleher's views and she stated most of the points I wanted to make.

I would certainly concur that there is a very big difference between how these parties behave. It is true not only with respect to Europe. We have seen it here, we have seen in Australia recently with the Bob Hawke government, which talked quite differently about security and defense issues before it came to power than actually what it followed afterward.

I also think that Catherine is right in pointed out, in both of presentations today we indicated that despite the problems of the first 5 years of the 1980's in Europe, despite shifts in sentiment on neutralism and unilateralism, there, nevertheless, remains a strong consensus in most of the NATO countries about the importance of NATO; and that it seems to me is not likely to go away in a hurry and would have a big bearing on the actual behavior of any European government, any new government that would come to power.

Earl Ravenal I think is right in saying that various strands in American society, including the American right wing, reacts strongly to expressions of criticism of the United States in Europe. Up till now, this criticism has largely come from very vocal minority groups.

If, in fact, what Catherine Kelleher and I have just said did not turn out to be true, if, in fact, you had 10, 15, or 20 years from now governments in power that took the same position that small minorities have up until now, there is no question but that this would have a very profound impact here in the United States. It would have a very profound impact on the willingness of both the American people and their leaders to support the kind of commitments that we have supported over the last three and a half decades. But at the moment, that does not seem to be looming in the near future.

Senator MATHIAS. What is the Soviet assessment of the situation as far as you can tell? Are they sufficiently sanguine that this tension between the American right and the European left will play in their favor, that they are willing to bide their time with patience? Is this a factor in their strategic thinking?

Ms. KELLEHER. I think in a sense the Soviets remain ever hopeful that they will find the right instrument with which the divide the Europeans, particularly the European publics, from the United States.

I think if one goes back, again, to the INF episode, which I think still is very central to the thinking of many on this issue, one finds the Soviet Union quite prepared through really the spring of 1983, to believe that their campaign to join with European opposition against INF will be successful. I think that was reflected both in their propaganda efforts and in their negotiating strategy vis-a-vis the United States on INF limitation.

My sense, though, is, particularly given the campaign of the moment, which is anti-SDI and which is not as extensive as the Soviet INF campaign was, but which is one that is gathering momentum, that the Soviets still view the situation as one in which they can mobilize public support against an American decision on the basis not only of its impact on specific alliance-related issues, but somehow in portraying the United States as being the disturber of the international peace.

Senator, I have just come back from a meeting and talking with a number of Europeans in Berlin, and my sense is that they have had very little success so far even in reviving the points, shall we say, of organized dissent that were obvious in the period 1981 to 1983.

Mr. RAVENAL. I think that the Soviets began to realize, after the fiasco of their attempt to influence the German electorate on the matter of INF deployments, that heavy breathing can be very counterproductive. And yet, observing the tensions, as you put it, between the European left and the American right, and expressions and demonstrations in Western Europe, I think that more realistically from now on they may be content just to let ripe fruit fall from the tree and sit back and enjoy the spectacle. They won't achieve dramatic successes; but I think they might be able to see certain specific American moves frustrated by European political opinion, particularly in the left part of the spectrum.

Ironically, it seems to me that, despite constant Soviet overt moves to try to decouple the United States from the defense of Europe, what the Soviets might in the long run most fear would be a self-reliant European defense without the United States, because

that would be a defense that would be integral to Europe and might actually be free of those tensions, those transatlantic tensions, that offer the Soviets occasional opportunity for meddling.

Senator MATHIAS. Of course, that is not the only irony in the situation. The irony that the American right should be the handmaiden of the Soviet Union is another.

Mr. RAVENAL. I think that is a further irony in the situation indeed.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PRESSLER. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Mathias has already touched upon the question I had for you. But I would like perhaps to go back to the question having to do with the emergence of differing points of view on the question of the relationship between the United States and the NATO alliance.

It seems to me, that it is a fairly recent phenomenon. Correct me if I am wrong on that. But in the post-World War II period, it was not really a domestic political issue in most European countries to any significant degree, regardless of who you spoke to.

There was the question of support for NATO, but foreign policy interests were really not the subject of debate. It was domestic economic policy and so forth which really showed the major points of division.

There has obviously been a change in that. I am curious, however, as to what extent that change really does exist or is it one that has been promoted in the media, where those issues are highlighted due to the obvious interest that we have here about whether or not the respective members of NATO are remaining committed.

I would also like you to pursue the question of political parties a little bit more. I am intrigued by it.

There is also the question of the southern cone of Europe and what appears to be some changes there. The Socialist International, contrary to what most people probably think, never opposed, as an organization, United States involvement in Vietnam. By and large, there was a unanimity of thought on foreign policy issues.

We see a change in that now, though, particularly among the Northern European members of the Socialist International, who are a much more hard-line group than the Felipe Gonzalezes, the Craxis, and so on in the southern part of Eurcpe.

Of what significance is that?

Third, I was intrigued, I guess like everyone in politics, with the surveys, Mr. Rielly. We are fascinated by numbers and public attitudes and so on.

As for the Nunn and Mansfield amendments, I opposed the Nunn amendment on the floor. I don't think Sam Nunn had any intention of that amendment being adopted. In fact I think he got somewhat concerned, at one point, that the amendment might actually pass. It was really just a shot across the bow. It would not have taken much effort to modify that amendment to, say, reducing our commitment to NATO by 5 percent a year for the next 10 years, or something to that effect. That would not have been as dramatic as an immediate reduction in commitment and certainly might have picked up the necessary votes to carry in the Senate.

Mansfield I think, came within three or four votes 20 years ago of substantially reducing our commitment.

I imagine you'd get support from Connecticut to California and from places in between by announcing that you intend to reduce the financial commitment for United States forces in Europe and to let the Europeans assume a greater burden of their own defense needs.

You can imagine the political reaction to such a proposal. I am somewhat intrigued, though, because the polling data certainly does not indicate that that is the case.

And yet, I sense that this is not an unpopular position to be taking at this time. Hence, that is one of the reasons why Sam Nunn did as well as he did on his amendment.

It was not a tough political issue, nor was it difficult to go back to one's respective States and districts and give a speech in support of it.

I would be interested in hearing more on those three points I just mentioned and on the parties and where this is all heading.

Then lastly, Mr. Rielly, you could comment on the data, let me say that I am not arguing with your numbers, I believe your numbers are correct. They seem, though, to belie what I sense is a very deep political undercurrent in this country in support of a substantial reduction in our military commitment to NATO. I don't believe there is much support for the idea of a total withdrawal. But as I said, I think there is great support in this country for a substantial reduction in our military commitment.

Let me say that I don't necessarily agree with that.

Mr. RIELLY. Mr. Chairman, let me comment on the first and third questions raised by Senator Dodd.

On the question of a breakdown of consensus in Europe or party differences on security issues, there is no question, I think, that the public perception, even perhaps the leadership perception in this country, has been that there has been a very strong consensus and a relative absence of party difference on the security issues of the last 20 years.

In reviewing this question, I have noted that some European analysts say that party political differences on security issues have always existed. But one of the differences is that, in the past, if I might quote one of them, it said, in the past, "security policy was delimited as a collective interest, not as a subject of domestic political battle. And in the judgment of this person," he concluded, he said, "what has changed in the past 5 years is that security policy has once again become a tool in the struggle for domestic political advantage."

I think that to some extent that probably is true in selected European countries, especially, as Catherine Kelleher mentioned, and Senator Mathias, too, in the United Kingdom and in the Federal Republic of Germany.

I will pass on the southern flank question.

Related to your comments about the Mansfield amendment, the Nunn amendment, as well as to the fact that an American Senator or Congressman can give a speech advocating that the American burden in the defense of Europe be reduced and the European be

increased, and get a round of applause, I think that is true. I guess one of the questions I would raise is this.

We have in this field the issue called the salience issue, and how does this issue loom in terms of priority related to other issues?

In Connecticut, for example, is that an issue that decides votes? When people go to vote, do they look at Senator Dodd's stand on that issue, or is that a relatively marginal issue in their view, less important in their point of view, and therefore they are quite prepared to let Senator Dodd how he should vote on that issue?

One of the ways in which this issue has come up a lot in Europe recently is we have heard about it and we have seen documented through some of the studies we have quoted here today a shift in political attitude and culture in Europe, precisely at the same time when Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl were not only elected but reelected and returned to power, and people will ask how do you reconcile these sharp shifts.

I think that one explanation for ~~this is,~~ again, it is the salience issues. These issues are important to a very small percentage of the population, but in great part they really don't shift votes.

I guess one of the questions I would raise with you, Senator, is have you found, in addition to getting applause or witnessing applause for that kind of speech, have you found that people like yourself have opposed the Mansfield amendment, the Nunn amendment? Do you find that it is any great political liability, does it cost you a lot, or are people prepared to let you take a leadership position on that and remain relatively independent in your judgment without any high political cost?

Senator DODD. Let me just comment. Those are two good questions.

First, let me say that using the State of Connecticut as an example is maybe not the best in that we are perhaps the most dependent State in the country, on a per capita basis, on exports. There has historically been a strong association with its representation in Washington going back 40 years in foreign relations or international relations as issues, as political issues. So there is probably more of an acceptance than you might find elsewhere here.

I think probably what I was suggesting to you has more to do with a general attidue, the deep strain of isolationism that has existed in this country since its founding, and that this is just a reflection of that trend. It has hardly abated over the years in many ways.

And yet, I don't think it is at all a priority issue, if you were to ask people the open-ended question of what are the most important issues. But I have seen and have had to explain why I thought it was important for the United States to maintain its commitment. I don't take the position that the commitment ought to be necessarily left in the status quo at all. There is certainly significant room to look at the levels of commitment, obviously the levels of commitment of our European allies, and so forth.

But I would still suggest to you that while it is not an issue that is raised in open-ended surveys or one that an audience is apt to bring up on its own, when people in public life find themselves looking for an issue that they can create a constituency from, this

is not a bad one. I would relate it generally to foreign aid questions.

I have discovered that when the issue is raised, you find a very receptive audience. That is the danger, in a sense. That is what is sort of intriguing to me. When you've asked the question about the levels of commitment and what should be done, people are very supportive. As I say, I don't question that. But when I have seen the issue raised, even to suggest that our interests, our geopolitical interests are probably better served by focusing our attention on the Pacific Rim, on Western Hemisphere issues, on the Middle East, for example, and that we could do a better job in that arena were we to reduce our financial commitment in Europe, it is not a tough issue. We find a very receptive audience.

Now I am not talking about an uneducated audience that will react to that either, but rather sophisticated audiences.

Thank you.

Mr. RAVENAL. I wonder if I could also comment on Senator Dodd's remarks, because I find that they have touched upon some very interesting issues that I think are essential to the question of the continuance of American support for NATO.

It would appear—and this is something that is not reached by the standard public opinion questioning—that support for NATO might be the proverbial mile wide, but inch deep. And the way to get at this sentiment—I don't mean to be offering professional advice to a very experienced pollster—but it seems to me that we have been asking the wrong questions and that we have to ask a structured series of questions to people in an attempt to elicit these deeper attitudes.

The questions would go something like this: Do you really think that anything would happen in Europe if the Americans withdrew a significant number of troops and a lot of their financial support for the alliance? The answer probably would be: Well, not really.

The next question: If you knew that the United States was spending $134 billion a year and $2.2 trillion in the next decade on the defense of Europe, would you want to continue to do that? The answer would clearly be: No, by probably 97 percent.

Senator DODD. You sound like you have been giving the speech I was talking about. [Laughter.]

Mr. RAVENAL. A third question: Do you think the Europeans could do more to defend themselves? The answer would clearly be, overwhelmingly, "Yes."

Senator DODD. Japan is a good example as well, and there you would see more action.

Mr. RAVENAL. I beg your pardon?

Senator DODD. I am referring to Japan and the question of just 1 percent of their budget going to their own defense.

Mr. RAVENAL. The percentage of GNP?

Senator DODD. No, it is more than 1 percent of GNP, but it is 1 percent of their budget that Japan expends on its own defense needs.

Mr. RAVENAL. Yes. The disparities there also could be questioned.

Next question. Can we continue to sustain the level of budget deficits, $250 billion a year that are out on the horizon? The answer clearly would be "No."

Would you like to see taxes substantially raised, your taxes? Clearly that would be: No.

So, the aggregate of the answers to these, what I call second order kinds of questions—not the first order questions like do you love the Europeans and would you like to continue to defend Western Europe against the Communists?—the answers to these second order questions clearly indicate the instability, at the very least, of American support for NATO, which can, in turn, be touched upon and mined by sensitive politicians, as you have commented.

I think that that—which is a set of facts that has not been elicited by the excellent, in almost every other respect, data of the Chicago Council—it is that phenomenon that has to be more closely examined. I think that we are going to come up with much more disturbing answers than have been reflected this morning.

Senator DODD. That's what I was suggesting.

I have a lot of respect for people who examine these issues and do data like this. But it is my political instincts that I am talking about more than anything else.

I felt more of a tactile kind of thing. I just feel it out there. I think it is the kind of issue where a very clever demagogue—and he need not necessarily be so clever—could really create a political issue and build this kind of momentum.

There is no doubt in my mind that if Sam Nunn had modified his amendment slightly or even pursued it more diligently, the U.S. Senate would have gone on record as supporting deep cuts. There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever.

Ms. KELLEHER. Senator, might I make a comment? With the greatest respect for my colleague, Dr. Ravenal, the North Atlantic Alliance can be blamed for lots of things, but it cannot be blamed for American opposition to increased taxes. I think that precedes the NATO alliance and a few other things as well.

I would like to say that my sense, having looked at some of the same data that John Rielly has used in his surveys, from a somewhat different perspective, would suggest that the real question, perhaps at the base of this, is a question of equity, the belief fostered, I think by the lack of understanding among the American population that somehow they are being asked to make an inequitable sacrifice.

I know that you, among others, have entertained strings of witnesses that have said that 80 percent of the ground forces come from Europeans, this amount of money comes from Europeans, all of this effort is made, they all have conscript systems—you know, that image of European effort is not broadly disseminated. We still have a very simple image of what it is that the United States is doing and no appreciation of how it fits into this total picture.

That is too difficult, I am aware, to give in the kind of speech that you are talking about. But it seems to me that we might do somewhat better than we have done in the past in suggesting we are not standing there all by ourselves and are the only things that stand between a defeated Europe and a Europe that is, in fact, capable of being defended.

Senator DODD. It is also, I think, part and parcel of a problem. The media does not write about planes that fly. The American public seems only to be given, whether on the television or in the newspapers, accounts of anti-American feeling that certainly exists in many quarters abroad. But it has very little information that it receives about the substantial support that still does exist.

So, it is that reaction, that historical reaction, that is fed by an awful lot of that information. I think it contributes to it significantly.

Would you touch on that a bit? I know, going back 40 years ago, our support—I may be wrong on this—it seems to me there was more support in northern European countries for U.S. policy interests, that we had more difficulty with those countries in the southern flank of Europe; and today we find, for instance, in Latin American policy that it is the members of Socialist International from the Italys, the Portugals, and Spains that are far more constructive, far more moderate in terms of U.S. policy in this hemisphere than some from Holland, Belgium, or some Scandinavian countries.

Has that really changed? If so, why?

Ms. KELLEHER. It has and it has not. If I can speak from a political analyst's point of view, I think that the last set of real discussions in most of the European countries about issues related to NATO happened at the end of the 1950's. Then this period that I call the "conspiracy of silence," the agreement not to disagree in public about security issues, really came into force in most countries.

What you have seen in the last 5 years, parallel perhaps to developments in the United States is a kind of "reideologalization"—that is a hard word even to pronounce—in other words, an emphasis on ideology once again that is coming to the fore. So, what you have is parties which proved their fidelity to old principles for the first time since about the 1960's—sort of 1963 in Britain is the end, and in Germany it is 1959—that you have seen this kind of debate. The question is why?

No one really has a satisfactory answer. There seem to be a number of things that came together that really were crystallized by the INF debate: Fear about the United States in terms of fear that always accompanies a change in the American political administration, and particularly if the President is someone not known or not trusted. But also there are some other things, this rampant fear that war was imminent, that something was going to happen that would bring about worldwide conflagration. That is definitely something on which not just in northern Europe but particularly in northern Europe opposition parties have been willing to make electoral capital, because they see votes there.

To some extent—and this is perhaps back to political science—it is, as I think the Palme election in Sweden shows, that the parties, particularly on the left, are really scrambling to maintain their hold on their own constituencies. So, therefore, they become more defensive of ideology rather than less, in order to hold on to a small margin that would make the difference in the essentially national stalemate between two big parties.

That is one explanation.

The second, particularly having to do with Central America, is that the Socialists International, and particularly the northern European members, made a concerted effort to do what they considered political democratic education in Central America, sort of after what they saw as their success in bringing about Socialist legitimacy in Spain and also in Portugal. After the removal of the authoritarian regimes, they decided they would use those techniques elsewhere in the world and both—I am speaking particularly of the German Socialists and the Swedish Socialists—really did a great deal of fieldwork beginning in the early 1970's in terms of community education. And, for a very long time, a number of the changes in Central America, including those in Nicaragua, were sort of look on as their success, that they had brought about this kind of participatory style on the local level. They are, therefore, very loathe to let this symbol of success be totally swept away.

I think you will find, again, if you go back, looking to 1983, I think that Socialists International had its last sweeping declaration of support for the Sandinista regime. Since that time, it has been on the part of individual leaders themselves but not by Socialists International.

Mr. RIELLY. Senator, may I just make one other comment on the question of the differences between attitudes on important foreign policy issues related to the United States in northern Europe versus southern Europe?

You have in Spain, Portugal, France, and Italy Socialist governments today, and in all of those countries, during most of the period since 1945 and until about 1980, you had a real Communist Party in those countries which was a real political alternative and had a real possibility at least to go into a government if not form one.

This was not true in the northern European countries at all, and, consequently, the Socialists who came to power often found that their biggest enemy in many respects was the real Communist Party that existed.

That is one of the reasons, though not the only one, of course, why European Socialists and Social Democrats have always been those who have had the fewest illusions about what communists are and what Communism means. That tends also to relate to the fact that you really don't have very strong pacifist movements in southern Europe, or anything comparable to what you find in northern Europe. In certain countries at certain times, pacific movements played a role on certain issues that the Communist Parties have played in France, Spain, Italy, and so forth.

I think that is one more reason why you do have some overall difference between northern and southern Europe on some of these issues.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much. There may be additional questions from Senators who were unable to be here.

Let me thank this panel. I think that this has been a very informed and useful panel. I have benefitted much from listening to you. I am sure that other members of the committee will benefit also.

Your testimony will be distributed to all members. This will conclude the hearing this morning.

We will continue at 1:30 this afternoon with Mr. Sonnenfeldt.

At this time, therefore, the subcommittee stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 11:29, p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

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